Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/ecc/ecc_verify_hash.c @ 1653:76189c9ffea2
External Public-Key Authentication API (#72)
* Implemented dynamic loading of an external plug-in shared library to delegate public key authentication
* Moved conditional compilation of the plugin infrastructure into the configure.ac script to be able to add -ldl to dropbear build only when the flag is enabled
* Added tags file to the ignore list
* Updated API to have the constructor to return function pointers in the pliugin instance. Added support for passing user name to the checkpubkey function. Added options to the session returned by the plugin and have dropbear to parse and process them
* Added -rdynamic to the linker flags when EPKA is enabled
* Changed the API to pass a previously created session to the checkPubKey function (created during preauth)
* Added documentation to the API
* Added parameter addrstring to plugin creation function
* Modified the API to retrieve the auth options. Instead of having them as field of the EPKASession struct, they are stored internally (plugin-dependent) in the plugin/session and retrieved through a pointer to a function (in the session)
* Changed option string to be a simple char * instead of unsigned char *
author | fabriziobertocci <fabriziobertocci@gmail.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 15 May 2019 09:43:57 -0400 |
parents | 8305ebe45940 |
children | 1ff2a1034c52 |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" #if defined(LTC_MECC) && defined(LTC_DER) /** @file ecc_verify_hash.c ECC Crypto, Tom St Denis */ static int _ecc_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key, int sigformat) { ecc_point *mG, *mQ; void *r, *s, *v, *w, *u1, *u2, *e, *p, *m; void *mp; int err; unsigned long pbits, pbytes, i, shift_right; unsigned char ch, buf[MAXBLOCKSIZE]; LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); /* default to invalid signature */ *stat = 0; mp = NULL; /* is the IDX valid ? */ if (ltc_ecc_is_valid_idx(key->idx) != 1) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_TYPE; } /* allocate ints */ if ((err = mp_init_multi(&r, &s, &v, &w, &u1, &u2, &p, &e, &m, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return CRYPT_MEM; } /* allocate points */ mG = ltc_ecc_new_point(); mQ = ltc_ecc_new_point(); if (mQ == NULL || mG == NULL) { err = CRYPT_MEM; goto error; } if (sigformat == 1) { /* RFC7518 format */ if ((siglen % 2) == 1) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto error; } i = siglen / 2; if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(r, (unsigned char *)sig, i)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(s, (unsigned char *)sig+i, i)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { /* ASN.1 format */ if ((err = der_decode_sequence_multi(sig, siglen, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, r, LTC_ASN1_INTEGER, 1UL, s, LTC_ASN1_EOL, 0UL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* get the order */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(p, (char *)key->dp->order, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* get the modulus */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(m, (char *)key->dp->prime, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* check for zero */ if (mp_iszero(r) || mp_iszero(s) || mp_cmp(r, p) != LTC_MP_LT || mp_cmp(s, p) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; goto error; } /* read hash - truncate if needed */ pbits = mp_count_bits(p); pbytes = (pbits+7) >> 3; if (pbits > hashlen*8) { if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)hash, hashlen)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else if (pbits % 8 == 0) { if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)hash, pbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { shift_right = 8 - pbits % 8; for (i=0, ch=0; i<pbytes; i++) { buf[i] = ch; ch = (hash[i] << (8-shift_right)); buf[i] = buf[i] ^ (hash[i] >> shift_right); } if ((err = mp_read_unsigned_bin(e, (unsigned char *)buf, pbytes)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* w = s^-1 mod n */ if ((err = mp_invmod(s, p, w)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u1 = ew */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(e, w, p, u1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* u2 = rw */ if ((err = mp_mulmod(r, w, p, u2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* find mG and mQ */ if ((err = mp_read_radix(mG->x, (char *)key->dp->Gx, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_read_radix(mG->y, (char *)key->dp->Gy, 16)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_set(mG->z, 1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.x, mQ->x)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.y, mQ->y)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_copy(key->pubkey.z, mQ->z)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* compute u1*mG + u2*mQ = mG */ if (ltc_mp.ecc_mul2add == NULL) { if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptmul(u1, mG, mG, m, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptmul(u2, mQ, mQ, m, 0)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* find the montgomery mp */ if ((err = mp_montgomery_setup(m, &mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* add them */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_ptadd(mQ, mG, mG, m, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* reduce */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_map(mG, m, mp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } else { /* use Shamir's trick to compute u1*mG + u2*mQ using half of the doubles */ if ((err = ltc_mp.ecc_mul2add(mG, u1, mQ, u2, mG, m)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } } /* v = X_x1 mod n */ if ((err = mp_mod(mG->x, p, v)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } /* does v == r */ if (mp_cmp(v, r) == LTC_MP_EQ) { *stat = 1; } /* clear up and return */ err = CRYPT_OK; error: ltc_ecc_del_point(mG); ltc_ecc_del_point(mQ); mp_clear_multi(r, s, v, w, u1, u2, p, e, m, NULL); if (mp != NULL) { mp_montgomery_free(mp); } return err; } /** Verify an ECC signature @param sig The signature to verify @param siglen The length of the signature (octets) @param hash The hash (message digest) that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param stat Result of signature, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public ECC key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is not valid) */ int ecc_verify_hash(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key) { return _ecc_verify_hash(sig, siglen, hash, hashlen, stat, key, 0); } /** Verify an ECC signature in RFC7518 format @param sig The signature to verify @param siglen The length of the signature (octets) @param hash The hash (message digest) that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash (octets) @param stat Result of signature, 1==valid, 0==invalid @param key The corresponding public ECC key @return CRYPT_OK if successful (even if the signature is not valid) */ int ecc_verify_hash_rfc7518(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen, int *stat, ecc_key *key) { return _ecc_verify_hash(sig, siglen, hash, hashlen, stat, key, 1); } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */