view libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c @ 1653:76189c9ffea2

External Public-Key Authentication API (#72) * Implemented dynamic loading of an external plug-in shared library to delegate public key authentication * Moved conditional compilation of the plugin infrastructure into the configure.ac script to be able to add -ldl to dropbear build only when the flag is enabled * Added tags file to the ignore list * Updated API to have the constructor to return function pointers in the pliugin instance. Added support for passing user name to the checkpubkey function. Added options to the session returned by the plugin and have dropbear to parse and process them * Added -rdynamic to the linker flags when EPKA is enabled * Changed the API to pass a previously created session to the checkPubKey function (created during preauth) * Added documentation to the API * Added parameter addrstring to plugin creation function * Modified the API to retrieve the auth options. Instead of having them as field of the EPKASession struct, they are stored internally (plugin-dependent) in the plugin/session and retrieved through a pointer to a function (in the session) * Changed option string to be a simple char * instead of unsigned char *
author fabriziobertocci <fabriziobertocci@gmail.com>
date Wed, 15 May 2019 09:43:57 -0400
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
line wrap: on
line source

/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
  @file rsa_verify_hash.c
  RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 or v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange
*/

#ifdef LTC_MRSA

/**
  PKCS #1 de-sign then v1.5 or PSS depad
  @param sig              The signature data
  @param siglen           The length of the signature data (octets)
  @param hash             The hash of the message that was signed
  @param hashlen          The length of the hash of the message that was signed (octets)
  @param padding          Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS, LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)
  @param hash_idx         The index of the desired hash
  @param saltlen          The length of the salt used during signature
  @param stat             [out] The result of the signature comparison, 1==valid, 0==invalid
  @param key              The public RSA key corresponding to the key that performed the signature
  @return CRYPT_OK on success (even if the signature is invalid)
*/
int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig,      unsigned long siglen,
                       const unsigned char *hash,     unsigned long hashlen,
                             int            padding,
                             int            hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen,
                             int           *stat,     rsa_key      *key)
{
  unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x;
  int           err;
  unsigned char *tmpbuf;

  LTC_ARGCHK(hash  != NULL);
  LTC_ARGCHK(sig   != NULL);
  LTC_ARGCHK(stat  != NULL);
  LTC_ARGCHK(key   != NULL);

  /* default to invalid */
  *stat = 0;

  /* valid padding? */

  if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
      (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) &&
      (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)) {
    return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
  }

  if (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) {
    /* valid hash ? */
    if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
       return err;
    }
  }

  /* get modulus len in bits */
  modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N));

  /* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
  modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N));
  if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) {
     return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
  }

  /* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */
  tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen);
  if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
     return CRYPT_MEM;
  }

  /* RSA decode it  */
  x = siglen;
  if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
     XFREE(tmpbuf);
     return err;
  }

  /* make sure the output is the right size */
  if (x != siglen) {
     XFREE(tmpbuf);
     return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
  }

  if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
    /* PSS decode and verify it */

    if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){
      err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
    }
    else{
      err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
    }

  } else {
    /* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */
    unsigned char *out;
    unsigned long outlen;
    int           decoded;

    /* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */
    outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3;
    out    = XMALLOC(outlen);
    if (out == NULL) {
      err = CRYPT_MEM;
      goto bail_2;
    }

    if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      XFREE(out);
      goto bail_2;
    }

    if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) {
      unsigned long loid[16], reallen;
      ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];

      /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
      if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
         err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
         goto bail_2;
      }

      /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */
      /* construct the SEQUENCE
        SEQUENCE {
           SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
                     blah    NULL
           }
           hash    OCTET STRING
        }
     */
      LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0]));
      LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL,              NULL,                          0);
      LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo,    0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,          digestinfo,                    2);
      LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo,    1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      tmpbuf,                        siglen);

      if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         /* fallback to Legacy:missing NULL */
         LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,          digestinfo,                    1);
         if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
           XFREE(out);
           goto bail_2;
         }
      }

      if ((err = der_length_sequence(siginfo, 2, &reallen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         XFREE(out);
         goto bail_2;
      }

      /* test OID */
      if ((reallen == outlen) &&
          (digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) &&
        (XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) &&
          (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) &&
        (XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
         *stat = 1;
      }
    } else {
      /* only check if the hash is equal */
      if ((hashlen == outlen) &&
          (XMEMCMP(out, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
        *stat = 1;
      }
    }

#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
    zeromem(out, outlen);
#endif
    XFREE(out);
  }

bail_2:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
  zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen);
#endif
  XFREE(tmpbuf);
  return err;
}

#endif /* LTC_MRSA */

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