Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c @ 1665:7c17995bcdfb
Improve address logging on early exit messages (#83)
Change 'Early exit' and 'Exit before auth' messages to include the IP
address & port as part of the message.
This allows log scanning utilities such as 'fail2ban' to obtain the
offending IP address as part of the failure event instead of extracting
the PID from the message and then scanning the log again for match
'child connection from' messages
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <[email protected]>
author | Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <6500011+ldir-EDB0@users.noreply.github.com> |
---|---|
date | Wed, 18 Mar 2020 15:28:56 +0000 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file dsa_verify_key.c DSA implementation, verify a key, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MDSA /** Validate a DSA key Yeah, this function should've been called dsa_validate_key() in the first place and for compat-reasons we keep it as it was (for now). @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { int err; err = dsa_int_validate_primes(key, stat); if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err; err = dsa_int_validate_pqg(key, stat); if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err; return dsa_int_validate_xy(key, stat); } /** Non-complex part (no primality testing) of the validation of DSA params (p, q, g) @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { void *tmp1, *tmp2; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); *stat = 0; /* check q-order */ if ( key->qord >= LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP || key->qord <= 15 || (unsigned long)key->qord >= mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) || (mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) - key->qord) >= LTC_MDSA_DELTA ) { return CRYPT_OK; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 1 < g < p */ if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) { return CRYPT_OK; } if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp1, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: q is a divisor of (p - 1) */ if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_div(tmp1, key->q, tmp1, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: g is a generator of a subgroup of order q in * the multiplicative group of GF(p) - so we make sure that g^q mod p = 1 */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(tmp1, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } err = CRYPT_OK; *stat = 1; error: mp_clear_multi(tmp2, tmp1, NULL); return err; } /** Primality testing of DSA params p and q @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_primes(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { int err, res; *stat = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* key->q prime? */ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->q, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (res == LTC_MP_NO) { return CRYPT_OK; } /* key->p prime? */ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (res == LTC_MP_NO) { return CRYPT_OK; } *stat = 1; return CRYPT_OK; } /** Validation of a DSA key (x and y values) @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_xy(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { void *tmp; int err; *stat = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* 1 < y < p-1 */ if ((err = mp_init(&tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(key->y, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->y, tmp) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } if (key->type == PK_PRIVATE) { /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 0 < x < q */ if (mp_cmp_d(key->x, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->x, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: y = g^x mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->y) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } } else { /* with just a public key we cannot test y = g^x mod p therefore we * only test that y^q mod p = 1, which makes sure y is in g^x mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } } err = CRYPT_OK; *stat = 1; error: mp_clear(tmp); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */