view rsa.c @ 1665:7c17995bcdfb

Improve address logging on early exit messages (#83) Change 'Early exit' and 'Exit before auth' messages to include the IP address & port as part of the message. This allows log scanning utilities such as 'fail2ban' to obtain the offending IP address as part of the failure event instead of extracting the PID from the message and then scanning the log again for match 'child connection from' messages Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <[email protected]>
author Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <6500011+ldir-EDB0@users.noreply.github.com>
date Wed, 18 Mar 2020 15:28:56 +0000
parents bb8eaa26bc93
children ba6fc7afe1c5
line wrap: on
line source

/*
 * Dropbear - a SSH2 server
 * 
 * Copyright (c) 2002,2003 Matt Johnston
 * All rights reserved.
 * 
 * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 * of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 * in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 * to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 * 
 * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
 * all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 * 
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 * AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
 * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
 * SOFTWARE. */

/* Perform RSA operations on data, including reading keys, signing and
 * verification.
 *
 * The format is specified in rfc2437, Applied Cryptography or The Handbook of
 * Applied Cryptography detail the general algorithm. */

#include "includes.h"
#include "dbutil.h"
#include "bignum.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "dbrandom.h"

#if DROPBEAR_RSA 

static void rsa_pad_em(const dropbear_rsa_key * key,
	const buffer *data_buf, mp_int * rsa_em);

/* Load a public rsa key from a buffer, initialising the values.
 * The key will have the same format as buf_put_rsa_key.
 * These should be freed with rsa_key_free.
 * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
int buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key) {

	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
	TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_pub_key"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	m_mp_alloc_init_multi(&key->e, &key->n, NULL);
	key->d = NULL;
	key->p = NULL;
	key->q = NULL;

	buf_incrpos(buf, 4+SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN); /* int + "ssh-rsa" */

	if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->e) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE
	 || buf_getmpint(buf, key->n) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: failure"))
		goto out;
	}

	if (mp_count_bits(key->n) < MIN_RSA_KEYLEN) {
		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "RSA key too short");
		goto out;
	}

	/* 64 bit is limit used by openssl, so we won't block any keys in the wild */
	if (mp_count_bits(key->e) > 64) {
		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "RSA key bad e");
		goto out;
	}

	TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: success"))
	ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
out:
	if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		m_mp_free_multi(&key->e, &key->n, NULL);
	}
	return ret;
}

/* Same as buf_get_rsa_pub_key, but reads private bits at the end.
 * Loads a private rsa key from a buffer
 * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
int buf_get_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key) {
	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;

	TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_priv_key"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);

	if (buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buf, key) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: pub: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
		return DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
	}
	
	key->d = NULL;
	key->p = NULL;
	key->q = NULL;

	m_mp_alloc_init_multi(&key->d, NULL);
	if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->d) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: d: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
		goto out;
	}

	if (buf->pos == buf->len) {
		/* old Dropbear private keys didn't keep p and q, so we will ignore them*/
	} else {
		m_mp_alloc_init_multi(&key->p, &key->q, NULL);

		if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
			TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: p: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
			goto out;
		}

		if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
			TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: q: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE"))
			goto out;
		}
	}

	ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
out:
	if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
		m_mp_free_multi(&key->d, &key->p, &key->q, NULL);
	}
	TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key"))
	return ret;
}
	

/* Clear and free the memory used by a public or private key */
void rsa_key_free(dropbear_rsa_key *key) {

	TRACE2(("enter rsa_key_free"))

	if (key == NULL) {
		TRACE2(("leave rsa_key_free: key == NULL"))
		return;
	}
	m_mp_free_multi(&key->d, &key->e, &key->p, &key->q, &key->n, NULL);
	m_free(key);
	TRACE2(("leave rsa_key_free"))
}

/* Put the public rsa key into the buffer in the required format:
 *
 * string	"ssh-rsa"
 * mp_int	e
 * mp_int	n
 */
void buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, const dropbear_rsa_key *key) {

	TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_pub_key"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);

	buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->e);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->n);

	TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_pub_key"))

}

/* Same as buf_put_rsa_pub_key, but with the private "x" key appended */
void buf_put_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, const dropbear_rsa_key *key) {

	TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_priv_key"))

	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buf, key);
	buf_putmpint(buf, key->d);

	/* new versions have p and q, old versions don't */
	if (key->p) {
		buf_putmpint(buf, key->p);
	}
	if (key->q) {
		buf_putmpint(buf, key->q);
	}


	TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_priv_key"))

}

#if DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY
/* Verify a signature in buf, made on data by the key given.
 * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */
int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, const dropbear_rsa_key *key, const buffer *data_buf) {
	unsigned int slen;
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_mdash);
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_em);
	int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;

	TRACE(("enter buf_rsa_verify"))

	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);

	m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);

	slen = buf_getint(buf);
	if (slen != (unsigned int)mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n)) {
		TRACE(("bad size"))
		goto out;
	}

	if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getptr(buf, buf->len - buf->pos),
				buf->len - buf->pos) != MP_OKAY) {
		TRACE(("failed reading rsa_s"))
		goto out;
	}

	/* check that s <= n-1 */
	if (mp_cmp(&rsa_s, key->n) != MP_LT) {
		TRACE(("s > n-1"))
		goto out;
	}

	/* create the magic PKCS padded value */
	rsa_pad_em(key, data_buf, &rsa_em);

	if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_s, key->e, key->n, &rsa_mdash) != MP_OKAY) {
		TRACE(("failed exptmod rsa_s"))
		goto out;
	}

	if (mp_cmp(&rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == MP_EQ) {
		/* signature is valid */
		TRACE(("success!"))
		ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
	}

out:
	mp_clear_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL);
	TRACE(("leave buf_rsa_verify: ret %d", ret))
	return ret;
}

#endif /* DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY */

/* Sign the data presented with key, writing the signature contents
 * to the buffer */
void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, const dropbear_rsa_key *key, const buffer *data_buf) {
	unsigned int nsize, ssize;
	unsigned int i;
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s);
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp1);
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp2);
	DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp3);
	
	TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_sign"))
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);

	m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_s, &rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);

	rsa_pad_em(key, data_buf, &rsa_tmp1);

	/* the actual signing of the padded data */

#if DROPBEAR_RSA_BLINDING

	/* With blinding, s = (r^(-1))((em)*r^e)^d mod n */

	/* generate the r blinding value */
	/* rsa_tmp2 is r */
	gen_random_mpint(key->n, &rsa_tmp2);

	/* rsa_tmp1 is em */
	/* em' = em * r^e mod n */

	/* rsa_s used as a temp var*/
	if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->e, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}
	if (mp_invmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->n, &rsa_tmp3) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}
	if (mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_s, key->n, &rsa_tmp2) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}

	/* rsa_tmp2 is em' */
	/* s' = (em')^d mod n */
	if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->d, key->n, &rsa_tmp1) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}

	/* rsa_tmp1 is s' */
	/* rsa_tmp3 is r^(-1) mod n */
	/* s = (s')r^(-1) mod n */
	if (mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp3, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}

#else

	/* s = em^d mod n */
	/* rsa_tmp1 is em */
	if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp1, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}

#endif /* DROPBEAR_RSA_BLINDING */

	mp_clear_multi(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL);
	
	/* create the signature to return */
	buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN);

	nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n);

	/* string rsa_signature_blob length */
	buf_putint(buf, nsize);
	/* pad out s to same length as n */
	ssize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&rsa_s);
	dropbear_assert(ssize <= nsize);
	for (i = 0; i < nsize-ssize; i++) {
		buf_putbyte(buf, 0x00);
	}

	if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, ssize)) != MP_OKAY) {
		dropbear_exit("RSA error");
	}
	buf_incrwritepos(buf, ssize);
	mp_clear(&rsa_s);

#if defined(DEBUG_RSA) && DEBUG_TRACE
	if (!debug_trace) {
		printhex("RSA sig", buf->data, buf->len);
	}
#endif
	

	TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_sign"))
}

/* Creates the message value as expected by PKCS, see rfc2437 etc */
/* format to be padded to is:
 * EM = 01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash
 *
 * where FF is repeated enough times to make EM one byte
 * shorter than the size of key->n
 *
 * prefix is the ASN1 designator prefix,
 * hex 30 21 30 09 06 05 2B 0E 03 02 1A 05 00 04 14
 *
 * rsa_em must be a pointer to an initialised mp_int.
 */
static void rsa_pad_em(const dropbear_rsa_key * key,
	const buffer *data_buf, mp_int * rsa_em) {

	/* ASN1 designator (including the 0x00 preceding) */
	const unsigned char rsa_asn1_magic[] = 
		{0x00, 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 
		 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14};
	const unsigned int RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN = 16;

	buffer * rsa_EM = NULL;
	hash_state hs;
	unsigned int nsize;
	
	dropbear_assert(key != NULL);
	nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n);

	rsa_EM = buf_new(nsize-1);
	/* type byte */
	buf_putbyte(rsa_EM, 0x01);
	/* Padding with 0xFF bytes */
	while(rsa_EM->pos != rsa_EM->size - RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN - SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
		buf_putbyte(rsa_EM, 0xff);
	}
	/* Magic ASN1 stuff */
	memcpy(buf_getwriteptr(rsa_EM, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN),
			rsa_asn1_magic, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN);
	buf_incrwritepos(rsa_EM, RSA_ASN1_MAGIC_LEN);

	/* The hash of the data */
	sha1_init(&hs);
	sha1_process(&hs, data_buf->data, data_buf->len);
	sha1_done(&hs, buf_getwriteptr(rsa_EM, SHA1_HASH_SIZE));
	buf_incrwritepos(rsa_EM, SHA1_HASH_SIZE);

	dropbear_assert(rsa_EM->pos == rsa_EM->size);

	/* Create the mp_int from the encoded bytes */
	buf_setpos(rsa_EM, 0);
	bytes_to_mp(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size),
			rsa_EM->size);
	buf_free(rsa_EM);
}

#endif /* DROPBEAR_RSA */