Mercurial > dropbear
view fuzzer-verify.c @ 1606:98d2b125eb89
kexhashbuf was much to small in kex fuzzers
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
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date | Thu, 08 Mar 2018 23:23:19 +0800 |
parents | 92c93b4a3646 |
children | f52919ffd3b1 |
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#include "fuzz.h" #include "session.h" #include "fuzz-wrapfd.h" #include "debug.h" static void setup_fuzzer(void) { fuzz_common_setup(); } static buffer *verifydata; /* Tests reading a public key and verifying a signature */ int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { static int once = 0; if (!once) { setup_fuzzer(); verifydata = buf_new(30); buf_putstring(verifydata, "x", 1); once = 1; } if (fuzz_set_input(Data, Size) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { return 0; } m_malloc_set_epoch(1); if (setjmp(fuzz.jmp) == 0) { sign_key *key = new_sign_key(); enum signkey_type type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY; if (buf_get_pub_key(fuzz.input, key, &type) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { if (buf_verify(fuzz.input, key, verifydata) == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { /* The fuzzer is capable of generating keys with a signature to match. We don't want false positives if the key is bogus, since a client/server wouldn't be trusting a bogus key anyway */ int boguskey = 0; if (type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) { /* So far have seen dss keys with bad p/q/g domain parameters */ int pprime, qprime; assert(mp_prime_is_prime(key->dsskey->p, 5, &pprime) == MP_OKAY); assert(mp_prime_is_prime(key->dsskey->q, 18, &qprime) == MP_OKAY); boguskey = !(pprime && qprime); /* Could also check g**q mod p == 1 */ } if (!boguskey) { printf("Random key/signature managed to verify!\n"); abort(); } } } sign_key_free(key); m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 0); } else { m_malloc_free_epoch(1, 1); TRACE(("dropbear_exit longjmped")) /* dropbear_exit jumped here */ } return 0; }