view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c @ 1659:d32bcb5c557d

Add Ed25519 support (#91) * Add support for Ed25519 as a public key type Ed25519 is a elliptic curve signature scheme that offers better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance. It may be used for both user and host keys. OpenSSH key import and fuzzer are not supported yet. Initially inspired by Peter Szabo. * Add curve25519 and ed25519 fuzzers * Add import and export of Ed25519 keys
author Vladislav Grishenko <themiron@users.noreply.github.com>
date Wed, 11 Mar 2020 21:09:45 +0500
parents 6dba84798cd5
children
line wrap: on
line source

/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis
 *
 * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic
 * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner.
 *
 * The library is free for all purposes without any express
 * guarantee it works.
 */
#include "tomcrypt.h"

/**
   @file dsa_verify_key.c
   DSA implementation, verify a key, Tom St Denis
*/

#ifdef LTC_MDSA

/**
   Validate a DSA key

     Yeah, this function should've been called dsa_validate_key()
     in the first place and for compat-reasons we keep it
     as it was (for now).

   @param key   The key to validate
   @param stat  [out]  Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
{
   int err;

   err = dsa_int_validate_primes(key, stat);
   if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err;

   err = dsa_int_validate_pqg(key, stat);
   if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err;

   return dsa_int_validate_xy(key, stat);
}

/**
   Non-complex part (no primality testing) of the validation
   of DSA params (p, q, g)

   @param key   The key to validate
   @param stat  [out]  Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
{
   void *tmp1, *tmp2;
   int  err;

   LTC_ARGCHK(key  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
   *stat = 0;

   /* check q-order */
   if ( key->qord >= LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP || key->qord <= 15 ||
        (unsigned long)key->qord >= mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) ||
        (mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) - key->qord) >= LTC_MDSA_DELTA ) {
      return CRYPT_OK;
   }

   /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 1 < g < p */
   if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) {
      return CRYPT_OK;
   }

   if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp1, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK)        { return err; }

   /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: q is a divisor of (p - 1) */
   if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK)                { goto error; }
   if ((err = mp_div(tmp1, key->q, tmp1, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK)         { goto error; }
   if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) {
      err = CRYPT_OK;
      goto error;
   }

   /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: g is a generator of a subgroup of order q in
    * the multiplicative group of GF(p) - so we make sure that g^q mod p = 1
    */
   if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; }
   if (mp_cmp_d(tmp1, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
      err = CRYPT_OK;
      goto error;
   }

   err   = CRYPT_OK;
   *stat = 1;
error:
   mp_clear_multi(tmp2, tmp1, NULL);
   return err;
}

/**
   Primality testing of DSA params p and q

   @param key   The key to validate
   @param stat  [out]  Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_int_validate_primes(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
{
   int err, res;

   *stat = 0;
   LTC_ARGCHK(key  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);

   /* key->q prime? */
   if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->q, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if (res == LTC_MP_NO) {
      return CRYPT_OK;
   }

   /* key->p prime? */
   if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if (res == LTC_MP_NO) {
      return CRYPT_OK;
   }

   *stat = 1;
   return CRYPT_OK;
}

/**
   Validation of a DSA key (x and y values)

   @param key   The key to validate
   @param stat  [out]  Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid
   @return CRYPT_OK if successful
*/
int dsa_int_validate_xy(dsa_key *key, int *stat)
{
   void *tmp;
   int  err;

   *stat = 0;
   LTC_ARGCHK(key  != NULL);
   LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);

   /* 1 < y < p-1 */
   if ((err = mp_init(&tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      return err;
   }
   if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
      goto error;
   }
   if (mp_cmp_d(key->y, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->y, tmp) != LTC_MP_LT) {
      err = CRYPT_OK;
      goto error;
   }

   if (key->type == PK_PRIVATE) {
      /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 0 < x < q */
      if (mp_cmp_d(key->x, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->x, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) {
         err = CRYPT_OK;
         goto error;
      }
      /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: y = g^x mod p */
      if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         goto error;
      }
      if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->y) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
         err = CRYPT_OK;
         goto error;
      }
   }
   else {
      /* with just a public key we cannot test y = g^x mod p therefore we
       * only test that y^q mod p = 1, which makes sure y is in g^x mod p
       */
      if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) {
         goto error;
      }
      if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) {
         err = CRYPT_OK;
         goto error;
      }
   }

   err   = CRYPT_OK;
   *stat = 1;
error:
   mp_clear(tmp);
   return err;
}

#endif

/* ref:         $Format:%D$ */
/* git commit:  $Format:%H$ */
/* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */