Mercurial > dropbear
view libtomcrypt/src/pk/dsa/dsa_verify_key.c @ 1933:e093ddc5b585
Fix extra default -i arguments for multihop
When multihop executes dbclient it should only add -i arguments
from the original commandline, not the default id_dropbear key.
Otherwise multiple -i arguments keep getting added which
results in servers disconnecting with too many auth attempts
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Fri, 01 Apr 2022 11:56:10 +0800 |
parents | 6dba84798cd5 |
children |
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/* LibTomCrypt, modular cryptographic library -- Tom St Denis * * LibTomCrypt is a library that provides various cryptographic * algorithms in a highly modular and flexible manner. * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file dsa_verify_key.c DSA implementation, verify a key, Tom St Denis */ #ifdef LTC_MDSA /** Validate a DSA key Yeah, this function should've been called dsa_validate_key() in the first place and for compat-reasons we keep it as it was (for now). @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_verify_key(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { int err; err = dsa_int_validate_primes(key, stat); if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err; err = dsa_int_validate_pqg(key, stat); if (err != CRYPT_OK || *stat == 0) return err; return dsa_int_validate_xy(key, stat); } /** Non-complex part (no primality testing) of the validation of DSA params (p, q, g) @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_pqg(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { void *tmp1, *tmp2; int err; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); *stat = 0; /* check q-order */ if ( key->qord >= LTC_MDSA_MAX_GROUP || key->qord <= 15 || (unsigned long)key->qord >= mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) || (mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->p) - key->qord) >= LTC_MDSA_DELTA ) { return CRYPT_OK; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 1 < g < p */ if (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->g, key->p) != LTC_MP_LT) { return CRYPT_OK; } if ((err = mp_init_multi(&tmp1, &tmp2, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: q is a divisor of (p - 1) */ if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if ((err = mp_div(tmp1, key->q, tmp1, tmp2)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_iszero(tmp2) != LTC_MP_YES) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: g is a generator of a subgroup of order q in * the multiplicative group of GF(p) - so we make sure that g^q mod p = 1 */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->q, key->p, tmp1)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(tmp1, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } err = CRYPT_OK; *stat = 1; error: mp_clear_multi(tmp2, tmp1, NULL); return err; } /** Primality testing of DSA params p and q @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_primes(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { int err, res; *stat = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* key->q prime? */ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->q, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (res == LTC_MP_NO) { return CRYPT_OK; } /* key->p prime? */ if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, LTC_MILLER_RABIN_REPS, &res)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if (res == LTC_MP_NO) { return CRYPT_OK; } *stat = 1; return CRYPT_OK; } /** Validation of a DSA key (x and y values) @param key The key to validate @param stat [out] Result of test, 1==valid, 0==invalid @return CRYPT_OK if successful */ int dsa_int_validate_xy(dsa_key *key, int *stat) { void *tmp; int err; *stat = 0; LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL); LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL); /* 1 < y < p-1 */ if ((err = mp_init(&tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; } if ((err = mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(key->y, 1) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->y, tmp) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } if (key->type == PK_PRIVATE) { /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: 0 < x < q */ if (mp_cmp_d(key->x, 0) != LTC_MP_GT || mp_cmp(key->x, key->q) != LTC_MP_LT) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } /* FIPS 186-4 chapter 4.1: y = g^x mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp(tmp, key->y) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } } else { /* with just a public key we cannot test y = g^x mod p therefore we * only test that y^q mod p = 1, which makes sure y is in g^x mod p */ if ((err = mp_exptmod(key->y, key->q, key->p, tmp)) != CRYPT_OK) { goto error; } if (mp_cmp_d(tmp, 1) != LTC_MP_EQ) { err = CRYPT_OK; goto error; } } err = CRYPT_OK; *stat = 1; error: mp_clear(tmp); return err; } #endif /* ref: $Format:%D$ */ /* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ /* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */