Mercurial > dropbear
changeset 641:2b1bb792cd4d dropbear-tfm
- Update tfm changes to current default tip
| author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
|---|---|
| date | Mon, 21 Nov 2011 19:52:28 +0800 |
| parents | 76097ec1a29a (diff) 452bcf810e44 (current diff) |
| children | 33fd2f3499d2 |
| files | bignum.c buffer.c buffer.h cli-kex.c common-kex.c configure.in dbutil.h dropbearkey.c dss.c dss.h gendss.c genrsa.c includes.h kex.h options.h random.c rsa.c rsa.h session.h svr-kex.c |
| diffstat | 22 files changed, 484 insertions(+), 503 deletions(-) [+] |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- a/bignum.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/bignum.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -22,52 +22,61 @@ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE * SOFTWARE. */ -/* Contains helper functions for mp_int handling */ +/* Contains helper functions for fp_int handling */ #include "includes.h" #include "dbutil.h" -/* wrapper for mp_init, failing fatally on errors (memory allocation) */ -void m_mp_init(mp_int *mp) { +/* wrapper for fp_init, failing fatally on errors (memory allocation) */ +void m_fp_init(fp_int *fp) { - if (mp_init(mp) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Mem alloc error"); - } + fp_init(fp); } -/* simplified duplication of bn_mp_multi's mp_init_multi, but die fatally +/* simplified duplication of bn_fp_multi's fp_init_multi, but die fatally * on error */ -void m_mp_init_multi(mp_int *mp, ...) +void m_fp_init_multi(fp_int *fp, ...) { - mp_int* cur_arg = mp; + fp_int* cur_arg = fp; va_list args; - va_start(args, mp); /* init args to next argument from caller */ + va_start(args, fp); /* init args to next argument from caller */ while (cur_arg != NULL) { - if (mp_init(cur_arg) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Mem alloc error"); - } - cur_arg = va_arg(args, mp_int*); + fp_init(cur_arg); + cur_arg = va_arg(args, fp_int*); } va_end(args); } -void bytes_to_mp(mp_int *mp, const unsigned char* bytes, unsigned int len) { +/* simplified duplication of bn_fp_multi's fp_init_multi, but die fatally + * on error */ +void m_fp_zero_multi(fp_int *fp, ...) +{ + fp_int* cur_arg = fp; + va_list args; - if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(mp, (unsigned char*)bytes, len) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Mem alloc error"); - } + va_start(args, fp); /* init args to next argument from caller */ + while (cur_arg != NULL) { + fp_zero(cur_arg); + cur_arg = va_arg(args, fp_int*); + } + va_end(args); } -/* hash the ssh representation of the mp_int mp */ -void sha1_process_mp(hash_state *hs, mp_int *mp) { +void bytes_to_fp(fp_int *fp, const unsigned char* bytes, unsigned int len) { + + fp_read_unsigned_bin(fp, (unsigned char*)bytes, len); +} + +/* hash the ssh representation of the fp_int fp */ +void sha1_process_fp(hash_state *hs, fp_int *fp) { int i; buffer * buf; buf = buf_new(512 + 20); /* max buffer is a 4096 bit key, plus header + some leeway*/ - buf_putmpint(buf, mp); + buf_putfpint(buf, fp); i = buf->pos; buf_setpos(buf, 0); sha1_process(hs, buf_getptr(buf, i), i);
--- a/bignum.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/bignum.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -27,9 +27,10 @@ #include "includes.h" -void m_mp_init(mp_int *mp); -void m_mp_init_multi(mp_int *mp, ...); -void bytes_to_mp(mp_int *mp, const unsigned char* bytes, unsigned int len); -void sha1_process_mp(hash_state *hs, mp_int *mp); +void m_fp_init(fp_int *fp); +void m_fp_init_multi(fp_int *fp, ...); +void m_fp_zero_multi(fp_int *fp, ...); +void bytes_to_fp(fp_int *fp, const unsigned char* bytes, unsigned int len); +void sha1_process_fp(hash_state *hs, fp_int *fp); #endif /* _BIGNUM_H_ */
--- a/buffer.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/buffer.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ /* avoid excessively large numbers, > ~8192 bits */ #define BUF_MAX_MPINT (8240 / 8) +#define BUF_MAX_FPINT (FP_MAX_SIZE / 8) + /* Create (malloc) a new buffer of size */ buffer* buf_new(unsigned int size) { @@ -279,24 +281,24 @@ /* for our purposes we only need positive (or 0) numbers, so will * fail if we get negative numbers */ -void buf_putmpint(buffer* buf, mp_int * mp) { +void buf_putfpint(buffer* buf, fp_int * fp) { unsigned int len, pad = 0; - TRACE(("enter buf_putmpint")) + TRACE(("enter buf_putfpint")) - dropbear_assert(mp != NULL); + dropbear_assert(fp != NULL); - if (SIGN(mp) == MP_NEG) { + if (SIGN(fp) == FP_NEG) { dropbear_exit("negative bignum"); } /* zero check */ - if (USED(mp) == 1 && DIGIT(mp, 0) == 0) { + if (USED(fp) == 1 && DIGIT(fp, 0) == 0) { len = 0; } else { - /* SSH spec requires padding for mpints with the MSB set, this code - * implements it */ - len = mp_count_bits(mp); + /* SSH spec requires padding for fpints with the MSB set, this code + * ifplements it */ + len = fp_count_bits(fp); /* if the top bit of MSB is set, we need to pad */ pad = (len%8 == 0) ? 1 : 0; len = len / 8 + 1; /* don't worry about rounding, we need it for @@ -312,29 +314,29 @@ if (pad) { buf_putbyte(buf, 0x00); } - if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(mp, buf_getwriteptr(buf, len-pad)) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("mpint error"); - } + /* Should always succseed */ + fp_to_unsigned_bin(fp, buf_getwriteptr(buf, len-pad)) ; + buf_incrwritepos(buf, len-pad); } - TRACE(("leave buf_putmpint")) + TRACE(("leave buf_putfpint")) } -/* Retrieve an mp_int from the buffer. +/* Retrieve an fp_int from the buffer. * Will fail for -ve since they shouldn't be required here. * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_getmpint(buffer* buf, mp_int* mp) { +int buf_getfpint(buffer* buf, fp_int* fp) { unsigned int len; len = buf_getint(buf); if (len == 0) { - mp_zero(mp); + fp_zero(fp); return DROPBEAR_SUCCESS; } - if (len > BUF_MAX_MPINT) { + if (len > BUF_MAX_FPINT) { return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; } @@ -343,9 +345,8 @@ return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; } - if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(mp, buf_getptr(buf, len), len) != MP_OKAY) { - return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; - } + /** Should always succseed */ + fp_read_unsigned_bin(fp, buf_getptr(buf, len), len); buf_incrpos(buf, len); return DROPBEAR_SUCCESS;
--- a/buffer.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/buffer.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ void buf_putint(buffer* buf, unsigned int val); void buf_putstring(buffer* buf, const unsigned char* str, unsigned int len); void buf_putbytes(buffer *buf, const unsigned char *bytes, unsigned int len); -void buf_putmpint(buffer* buf, mp_int * mp); -int buf_getmpint(buffer* buf, mp_int* mp); +void buf_putfpint(buffer* buf, fp_int * fp); +int buf_getfpint(buffer* buf, fp_int* fp); unsigned int buf_getint(buffer* buf); #endif /* _BUFFER_H_ */
--- a/cli-kex.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/cli-kex.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -43,15 +43,15 @@ void send_msg_kexdh_init() { - cli_ses.dh_e = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - cli_ses.dh_x = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init_multi(cli_ses.dh_e, cli_ses.dh_x, NULL); + cli_ses.dh_e = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + cli_ses.dh_x = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + m_fp_init_multi(cli_ses.dh_e, cli_ses.dh_x, NULL); gen_kexdh_vals(cli_ses.dh_e, cli_ses.dh_x); CHECKCLEARTOWRITE(); buf_putbyte(ses.writepayload, SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT); - buf_putmpint(ses.writepayload, cli_ses.dh_e); + buf_putfpint(ses.writepayload, cli_ses.dh_e); encrypt_packet(); ses.requirenext = SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY; } @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ /* Handle a diffie-hellman key exchange reply. */ void recv_msg_kexdh_reply() { - DEF_MP_INT(dh_f); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_f); sign_key *hostkey = NULL; unsigned int type, keybloblen; unsigned char* keyblob = NULL; @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ if (cli_ses.kex_state != KEXDH_INIT_SENT) { dropbear_exit("Received out-of-order kexdhreply"); } - m_mp_init(&dh_f); + m_fp_init(&dh_f); type = ses.newkeys->algo_hostkey; TRACE(("type is %d", type)) @@ -88,14 +88,15 @@ dropbear_exit("Bad KEX packet"); } - if (buf_getmpint(ses.payload, &dh_f) != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { - TRACE(("failed getting mpint")) + if (buf_getfpint(ses.payload, &dh_f) != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { + TRACE(("failed getting fpint")) dropbear_exit("Bad KEX packet"); } kexdh_comb_key(cli_ses.dh_e, cli_ses.dh_x, &dh_f, hostkey); - mp_clear(&dh_f); - mp_clear_multi(cli_ses.dh_e, cli_ses.dh_x, NULL); + fp_zero(&dh_f); + fp_zero(cli_ses.dh_e); + fp_zero(cli_ses.dh_x); m_free(cli_ses.dh_e); m_free(cli_ses.dh_x);
--- a/common-kex.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/common-kex.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -297,8 +297,8 @@ /* the dh_K and hash are the start of all hashes, we make use of that */ sha1_init(&hs); - sha1_process_mp(&hs, ses.dh_K); - mp_clear(ses.dh_K); + sha1_process_fp(&hs, ses.dh_K); + fp_zero(ses.dh_K); m_free(ses.dh_K); sha1_process(&hs, ses.hash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); m_burn(ses.hash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); @@ -523,10 +523,10 @@ { switch (ses.newkeys->algo_kex) { case DROPBEAR_KEX_DH_GROUP1: - bytes_to_mp(dh_p, dh_p_1, DH_P_1_LEN); + bytes_to_fp(dh_p, dh_p_1, DH_P_1_LEN); break; case DROPBEAR_KEX_DH_GROUP14: - bytes_to_mp(dh_p, dh_p_14, DH_P_14_LEN); + bytes_to_fp(dh_p, dh_p_14, DH_P_14_LEN); break; } } @@ -534,72 +534,67 @@ /* Initialises and generate one side of the diffie-hellman key exchange values. * See the transport rfc 4253 section 8 for details */ /* dh_pub and dh_priv MUST be already initialised */ -void gen_kexdh_vals(mp_int *dh_pub, mp_int *dh_priv) { +void gen_kexdh_vals(fp_int *dh_pub, fp_int *dh_priv) { - DEF_MP_INT(dh_p); - DEF_MP_INT(dh_q); - DEF_MP_INT(dh_g); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_p); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_q); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_g); TRACE(("enter send_msg_kexdh_reply")) - m_mp_init_multi(&dh_g, &dh_p, &dh_q, NULL); + m_fp_init_multi(&dh_g, &dh_p, &dh_q, NULL); /* read the prime and generator*/ load_dh_p(&dh_p); - if (mp_set_int(&dh_g, DH_G_VAL) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error"); - } + fp_set(&dh_g, DH_G_VAL); /* calculate q = (p-1)/2 */ /* dh_priv is just a temp var here */ - if (mp_sub_d(&dh_p, 1, dh_priv) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error"); - } - if (mp_div_2(dh_priv, &dh_q) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error"); - } + fp_sub_d(&dh_p, 1, dh_priv); + + fp_div_2(dh_priv, &dh_q); /* Generate a private portion 0 < dh_priv < dh_q */ - gen_random_mpint(&dh_q, dh_priv); + gen_random_fpint(&dh_q, dh_priv); /* f = g^y mod p */ - if (mp_exptmod(&dh_g, dh_priv, &dh_p, dh_pub) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(&dh_g, dh_priv, &dh_p, dh_pub) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error"); } - mp_clear_multi(&dh_g, &dh_p, &dh_q, NULL); + m_fp_zero_multi(&dh_g, &dh_p, &dh_q, NULL); } /* This function is fairly common between client/server, with some substitution * of dh_e/dh_f etc. Hence these arguments: * dh_pub_us is 'e' for the client, 'f' for the server. dh_pub_them is * vice-versa. dh_priv is the x/y value corresponding to dh_pub_us */ -void kexdh_comb_key(mp_int *dh_pub_us, mp_int *dh_priv, mp_int *dh_pub_them, +void kexdh_comb_key(fp_int *dh_pub_us, fp_int *dh_priv, fp_int *dh_pub_them, sign_key *hostkey) { - mp_int dh_p; - mp_int *dh_e = NULL, *dh_f = NULL; + fp_int dh_p; + fp_int *dh_e = NULL, *dh_f = NULL; hash_state hs; /* read the prime and generator*/ - m_mp_init(&dh_p); + m_fp_init(&dh_p); load_dh_p(&dh_p); /* Check that dh_pub_them (dh_e or dh_f) is in the range [1, p-1] */ - if (mp_cmp(dh_pub_them, &dh_p) != MP_LT - || mp_cmp_d(dh_pub_them, 0) != MP_GT) { + if (fp_cmp(dh_pub_them, &dh_p) != FP_LT + || fp_cmp_d(dh_pub_them, 0) != FP_GT) { dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error"); } /* K = e^y mod p = f^x mod p */ - ses.dh_K = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init(ses.dh_K); - if (mp_exptmod(dh_pub_them, dh_priv, &dh_p, ses.dh_K) != MP_OKAY) { + ses.dh_K = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + m_fp_init(ses.dh_K); + if (fp_exptmod(dh_pub_them, dh_priv, &dh_p, ses.dh_K) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("Diffie-Hellman error"); } /* clear no longer needed vars */ - mp_clear_multi(&dh_p, NULL); + m_fp_zero_multi(&dh_p, NULL); /* From here on, the code needs to work with the _same_ vars on each side, * not vice-versaing for client/server */ @@ -615,11 +610,11 @@ /* K_S, the host key */ buf_put_pub_key(ses.kexhashbuf, hostkey, ses.newkeys->algo_hostkey); /* e, exchange value sent by the client */ - buf_putmpint(ses.kexhashbuf, dh_e); + buf_putfpint(ses.kexhashbuf, dh_e); /* f, exchange value sent by the server */ - buf_putmpint(ses.kexhashbuf, dh_f); + buf_putfpint(ses.kexhashbuf, dh_f); /* K, the shared secret */ - buf_putmpint(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.dh_K); + buf_putfpint(ses.kexhashbuf, ses.dh_K); /* calculate the hash H to sign */ sha1_init(&hs); @@ -649,8 +644,8 @@ algo_type * s2c_hash_algo = NULL; algo_type * c2s_cipher_algo = NULL; algo_type * s2c_cipher_algo = NULL; - algo_type * c2s_comp_algo = NULL; - algo_type * s2c_comp_algo = NULL; + algo_type * c2s_cofp_algo = NULL; + algo_type * s2c_cofp_algo = NULL; /* the generic one */ algo_type * algo = NULL; @@ -718,20 +713,30 @@ TRACE(("hash s2c is %s", s2c_hash_algo->name)) /* compression_algorithms_client_to_server */ +<<<<<<< mine + c2s_cofp_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshcompress, &goodguess); + if (c2s_cofp_algo == NULL) { +======= c2s_comp_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, ses.compress_algos, &goodguess); if (c2s_comp_algo == NULL) { +>>>>>>> theirs erralgo = "comp c->s"; goto error; } - TRACE(("hash c2s is %s", c2s_comp_algo->name)) + TRACE(("hash c2s is %s", c2s_cofp_algo->name)) /* compression_algorithms_server_to_client */ +<<<<<<< mine + s2c_cofp_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, sshcompress, &goodguess); + if (s2c_cofp_algo == NULL) { +======= s2c_comp_algo = ses.buf_match_algo(ses.payload, ses.compress_algos, &goodguess); if (s2c_comp_algo == NULL) { +>>>>>>> theirs erralgo = "comp s->c"; goto error; } - TRACE(("hash s2c is %s", s2c_comp_algo->name)) + TRACE(("hash s2c is %s", s2c_cofp_algo->name)) /* languages_client_to_server */ buf_eatstring(ses.payload); @@ -762,8 +767,13 @@ (struct dropbear_hash*)s2c_hash_algo->data; ses.newkeys->trans.algo_mac = (struct dropbear_hash*)c2s_hash_algo->data; +<<<<<<< mine + ses.newkeys->recv_algo_comp = s2c_cofp_algo->val; + ses.newkeys->trans_algo_comp = c2s_cofp_algo->val; +======= ses.newkeys->recv.algo_comp = s2c_comp_algo->val; ses.newkeys->trans.algo_comp = c2s_comp_algo->val; +>>>>>>> theirs } else { /* SERVER */ ses.newkeys->recv.algo_crypt = @@ -778,8 +788,13 @@ (struct dropbear_hash*)c2s_hash_algo->data; ses.newkeys->trans.algo_mac = (struct dropbear_hash*)s2c_hash_algo->data; +<<<<<<< mine + ses.newkeys->recv_algo_comp = c2s_cofp_algo->val; + ses.newkeys->trans_algo_comp = s2c_cofp_algo->val; +======= ses.newkeys->recv.algo_comp = c2s_comp_algo->val; ses.newkeys->trans.algo_comp = s2c_comp_algo->val; +>>>>>>> theirs } /* reserved for future extensions */
--- a/configure.in Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/configure.in Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -82,8 +82,7 @@ ],,,) # Checks for libraries. -AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, CRYPTLIB="-lcrypt") -AC_SUBST(CRYPTLIB) +AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt") # Check if zlib is needed AC_ARG_WITH(zlib, @@ -146,7 +145,6 @@ if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_authenticate, , AC_MSG_ERROR([*** PAM missing - install first or check config.log ***])) AC_MSG_NOTICE(Enabling PAM) - AC_CHECK_FUNCS(pam_fail_delay) else AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_PAM,, Use PAM) AC_MSG_NOTICE(Disabling PAM) @@ -363,25 +361,6 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setutxent utmpxname) AC_CHECK_FUNCS(logout updwtmp logwtmp) -AC_ARG_ENABLE(bundled-libtom, - [ --enable-bundled-libtom Use bundled libtomcrypt/libtommath even if a system version exists], - [ - BUNDLED_LIBTOM=1 - AC_MSG_NOTICE(Forcing bundled libtom*) - ], - [ - BUNDLED_LIBTOM=0 - AC_CHECK_LIB(tomcrypt, register_cipher, , BUNDLED_LIBTOM=1) - AC_CHECK_LIB(tommath, mp_exptmod, , BUNDLED_LIBTOM=1) - ] -) - -if test $BUNDLED_LIBTOM = 1 ; then - AC_DEFINE(BUNDLED_LIBTOM,,Use bundled libtom) -fi - -AC_SUBST(BUNDLED_LIBTOM) - dnl Added from OpenSSH 3.6.1p2's configure.ac dnl allow user to disable some login recording features @@ -689,14 +668,6 @@ AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h) AC_OUTPUT(Makefile) AC_OUTPUT(libtomcrypt/Makefile) -AC_OUTPUT(libtommath/Makefile) - -AC_MSG_NOTICE() -if test $BUNDLED_LIBTOM = 1 ; then -AC_MSG_NOTICE(Using bundled libtomcrypt and libtommath) -else -AC_MSG_NOTICE(Using system libtomcrypt and libtommath) -fi - +#AC_OUTPUT(libtommath/Makefile) AC_MSG_NOTICE() AC_MSG_NOTICE(Now edit options.h to choose features.)
--- a/dbutil.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/dbutil.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ void disallow_core(); int m_str_to_uint(const char* str, unsigned int *val); -/* Used to force mp_ints to be initialised */ -#define DEF_MP_INT(X) mp_int X = {0, 0, 0, NULL} +/* Used to force fp_ints to be initialised */ +#define DEF_FP_INT(X) fp_int X = {{},0, 0} /* Dropbear assertion */ #define dropbear_assert(X) do { if (!(X)) { fail_assert(#X, __FILE__, __LINE__); } } while (0)
--- a/dropbearkey.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/dropbearkey.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -29,19 +29,19 @@ * RSA: * string "ssh-rsa" - * mp_int e - * mp_int n - * mp_int d - * mp_int p (newer versions only) - * mp_int q (newer versions only) + * fp_int e + * fp_int n + * fp_int d + * fp_int p (newer versions only) + * fp_int q (newer versions only) * * DSS: * string "ssh-dss" - * mp_int p - * mp_int q - * mp_int g - * mp_int y - * mp_int x + * fp_int p + * fp_int q + * fp_int g + * fp_int y + * fp_int x * */ #include "includes.h"
--- a/dss.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/dss.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -43,27 +43,30 @@ * The key will have the same format as buf_put_dss_key. * These should be freed with dss_key_free. * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_get_dss_pub_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_dss_key *key) { +int buf_get_dss_pub_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) { TRACE(("enter buf_get_dss_pub_key")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); - key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->g = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->y = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, key->g, key->y, NULL); + key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->g = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->y = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + fp_init(key->p); + fp_init(key->q); + fp_init(key->g); + fp_init(key->y); key->x = NULL; buf_incrpos(buf, 4+SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS_LEN); /* int + "ssh-dss" */ - if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE - || buf_getmpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE - || buf_getmpint(buf, key->g) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE - || buf_getmpint(buf, key->y) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { - TRACE(("leave buf_get_dss_pub_key: failed reading mpints")) + if (buf_getfpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE + || buf_getfpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE + || buf_getfpint(buf, key->g) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE + || buf_getfpint(buf, key->y) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + TRACE(("leave buf_get_dss_pub_key: failed reading fpints")) return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; } - if (mp_count_bits(key->p) < MIN_DSS_KEYLEN) { + if (fp_count_bits(key->p) < MIN_DSS_KEYLEN) { dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "DSS key too short"); TRACE(("leave buf_get_dss_pub_key: short key")) return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; @@ -76,7 +79,7 @@ /* Same as buf_get_dss_pub_key, but reads a private "x" key at the end. * Loads a private dss key from a buffer * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_get_dss_priv_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_dss_key *key) { +int buf_get_dss_priv_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) { int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE; @@ -87,9 +90,9 @@ return DROPBEAR_FAILURE; } - key->x = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init(key->x); - ret = buf_getmpint(buf, key->x); + key->x = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + m_fp_init(key->x); + ret = buf_getfpint(buf, key->x); if (ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { m_free(key->x); } @@ -99,7 +102,7 @@ /* Clear and free the memory used by a public or private key */ -void dss_key_free(dropbear_dss_key *key) { +void dss_key_free(dss_key *key) { TRACE(("enter dsa_key_free")) if (key == NULL) { @@ -107,23 +110,23 @@ return; } if (key->p) { - mp_clear(key->p); + fp_zero(key->p); m_free(key->p); } if (key->q) { - mp_clear(key->q); + fp_zero(key->q); m_free(key->q); } if (key->g) { - mp_clear(key->g); + fp_zero(key->g); m_free(key->g); } if (key->y) { - mp_clear(key->y); + fp_zero(key->y); m_free(key->y); } if (key->x) { - mp_clear(key->x); + fp_zero(key->x); m_free(key->x); } m_free(key); @@ -133,51 +136,54 @@ /* put the dss public key into the buffer in the required format: * * string "ssh-dss" - * mpint p - * mpint q - * mpint g - * mpint y + * fpint p + * fpint q + * fpint g + * fpint y */ -void buf_put_dss_pub_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_dss_key *key) { +void buf_put_dss_pub_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) { dropbear_assert(key != NULL); buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS_LEN); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->p); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->q); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->g); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->y); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->p); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->q); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->g); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->y); } /* Same as buf_put_dss_pub_key, but with the private "x" key appended */ -void buf_put_dss_priv_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_dss_key *key) { +void buf_put_dss_priv_key(buffer* buf, dss_key *key) { dropbear_assert(key != NULL); buf_put_dss_pub_key(buf, key); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->x); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->x); } #ifdef DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY /* Verify a DSS signature (in buf) made on data by the key given. * returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_dss_verify(buffer* buf, dropbear_dss_key *key, const unsigned char* data, +int buf_dss_verify(buffer* buf, dss_key *key, const unsigned char* data, unsigned int len) { unsigned char msghash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; hash_state hs; int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE; - DEF_MP_INT(val1); - DEF_MP_INT(val2); - DEF_MP_INT(val3); - DEF_MP_INT(val4); + DEF_FP_INT(val1); + DEF_FP_INT(val2); + DEF_FP_INT(val3); + DEF_FP_INT(val4); char * string = NULL; int stringlen; TRACE(("enter buf_dss_verify")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); - m_mp_init_multi(&val1, &val2, &val3, &val4, NULL); + fp_init(&val1); + fp_init(&val2); + fp_init(&val3); + fp_init(&val4); /* get blob, check length */ string = buf_getstring(buf, &stringlen); @@ -193,64 +199,64 @@ /* create the signature - s' and r' are the received signatures in buf */ /* w = (s')-1 mod q */ /* let val1 = s' */ - bytes_to_mp(&val1, &string[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + bytes_to_fp(&val1, &string[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], SHA1_HASH_SIZE); - if (mp_cmp(&val1, key->q) != MP_LT) { + if (fp_cmp(&val1, key->q) != FP_LT) { TRACE(("verify failed, s' >= q")) goto out; } /* let val2 = w = (s')^-1 mod q*/ - if (mp_invmod(&val1, key->q, &val2) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_invmod(&val1, key->q, &val2) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* u1 = ((SHA(M')w) mod q */ /* let val1 = SHA(M') = msghash */ - bytes_to_mp(&val1, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + bytes_to_fp(&val1, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); /* let val3 = u1 = ((SHA(M')w) mod q */ - if (mp_mulmod(&val1, &val2, key->q, &val3) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&val1, &val2, key->q, &val3) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* u2 = ((r')w) mod q */ /* let val1 = r' */ - bytes_to_mp(&val1, &string[0], SHA1_HASH_SIZE); - if (mp_cmp(&val1, key->q) != MP_LT) { + bytes_to_fp(&val1, &string[0], SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + if (fp_cmp(&val1, key->q) != FP_LT) { TRACE(("verify failed, r' >= q")) goto out; } /* let val4 = u2 = ((r')w) mod q */ - if (mp_mulmod(&val1, &val2, key->q, &val4) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&val1, &val2, key->q, &val4) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* v = (((g)^u1 (y)^u2) mod p) mod q */ /* val2 = g^u1 mod p */ - if (mp_exptmod(key->g, &val3, key->p, &val2) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(key->g, &val3, key->p, &val2) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* val3 = y^u2 mod p */ - if (mp_exptmod(key->y, &val4, key->p, &val3) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(key->y, &val4, key->p, &val3) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* val4 = ((g)^u1 (y)^u2) mod p */ - if (mp_mulmod(&val2, &val3, key->p, &val4) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&val2, &val3, key->p, &val4) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* val2 = v = (((g)^u1 (y)^u2) mod p) mod q */ - if (mp_mod(&val4, key->q, &val2) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mod(&val4, key->q, &val2) != FP_OKAY) { goto out; } /* check whether signatures verify */ - if (mp_cmp(&val2, &val1) == MP_EQ) { + if (fp_cmp(&val2, &val1) == FP_EQ) { /* good sig */ ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS; } out: - mp_clear_multi(&val1, &val2, &val3, &val4, NULL); + m_fp_zero_multi(&val1, &val2, &val3, &val4, NULL); m_free(string); return ret; @@ -262,16 +268,14 @@ /* convert an unsigned mp into an array of bytes, malloced. * This array must be freed after use, len contains the length of the array, * if len != NULL */ -static unsigned char* mptobytes(mp_int *mp, int *len) { +static unsigned char* fptobytes(fp_int *mp, int *len) { unsigned char* ret; int size; - size = mp_unsigned_bin_size(mp); + size = fp_unsigned_bin_size(mp); ret = m_malloc(size); - if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(mp, ret) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("Mem alloc error"); - } + fp_to_unsigned_bin(mp, ret); if (len != NULL) { *len = size; } @@ -292,7 +296,7 @@ * * Now we aren't relying on the random number generation to protect the private * key x, which is a long term secret */ -void buf_put_dss_sign(buffer* buf, dropbear_dss_key *key, const unsigned char* data, +void buf_put_dss_sign(buffer* buf, dss_key *key, const unsigned char* data, unsigned int len) { unsigned char msghash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; @@ -302,14 +306,14 @@ unsigned char privkeyhash[SHA512_HASH_SIZE]; unsigned char *privkeytmp; unsigned char proto_k[SHA512_HASH_SIZE]; - DEF_MP_INT(dss_protok); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_protok); #endif - DEF_MP_INT(dss_k); - DEF_MP_INT(dss_m); - DEF_MP_INT(dss_temp1); - DEF_MP_INT(dss_temp2); - DEF_MP_INT(dss_r); - DEF_MP_INT(dss_s); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_k); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_m); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_temp1); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_temp2); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_r); + DEF_FP_INT(dss_s); hash_state hs; TRACE(("enter buf_put_dss_sign")) @@ -320,11 +324,11 @@ sha1_process(&hs, data, len); sha1_done(&hs, msghash); - m_mp_init_multi(&dss_k, &dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, &dss_r, &dss_s, + m_fp_init_multi(&dss_k, &dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, &dss_r, &dss_s, &dss_m, NULL); #ifdef DSS_PROTOK /* hash the privkey */ - privkeytmp = mptobytes(key->x, &i); + privkeytmp = fptobytes(key->x, &i); sha512_init(&hs); sha512_process(&hs, "the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog", 44); sha512_process(&hs, privkeytmp, i); @@ -339,78 +343,72 @@ sha512_done(&hs, proto_k); /* generate k */ - m_mp_init(&dss_protok); - bytes_to_mp(&dss_protok, proto_k, SHA512_HASH_SIZE); - if (mp_mod(&dss_protok, key->q, &dss_k) != MP_OKAY) { + m_fp_init(&dss_protok); + bytes_to_fp(&dss_protok, proto_k, SHA512_HASH_SIZE); + if (fp_mod(&dss_protok, key->q, &dss_k) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } - mp_clear(&dss_protok); + m_fp_zero(&dss_protok); m_burn(proto_k, SHA512_HASH_SIZE); #else /* DSS_PROTOK not defined*/ - gen_random_mpint(key->q, &dss_k); + gen_random_fpint(key->q, &dss_k); #endif /* now generate the actual signature */ - bytes_to_mp(&dss_m, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + bytes_to_fp(&dss_m, msghash, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); /* g^k mod p */ - if (mp_exptmod(key->g, &dss_k, key->p, &dss_temp1) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(key->g, &dss_k, key->p, &dss_temp1) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } /* r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ - if (mp_mod(&dss_temp1, key->q, &dss_r) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mod(&dss_temp1, key->q, &dss_r) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } /* x*r mod q */ - if (mp_mulmod(&dss_r, key->x, key->q, &dss_temp1) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&dss_r, key->x, key->q, &dss_temp1) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } /* (SHA1(M) + xr) mod q) */ - if (mp_addmod(&dss_m, &dss_temp1, key->q, &dss_temp2) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_addmod(&dss_m, &dss_temp1, key->q, &dss_temp2) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } /* (k^-1) mod q */ - if (mp_invmod(&dss_k, key->q, &dss_temp1) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_invmod(&dss_k, key->q, &dss_temp1) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } /* s = (k^-1(SHA1(M) + xr)) mod q */ - if (mp_mulmod(&dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, key->q, &dss_s) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, key->q, &dss_s) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("DSS error"); } buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS, SSH_SIGNKEY_DSS_LEN); buf_putint(buf, 2*SHA1_HASH_SIZE); - writelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dss_r); + writelen = fp_unsigned_bin_size(&dss_r); dropbear_assert(writelen <= SHA1_HASH_SIZE); /* need to pad to 160 bits with leading zeros */ for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE - writelen; i++) { buf_putbyte(buf, 0); } - if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&dss_r, buf_getwriteptr(buf, writelen)) - != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("DSS error"); - } - mp_clear(&dss_r); + fp_to_unsigned_bin(&dss_r, buf_getwriteptr(buf, writelen)); + fp_zero(&dss_r); buf_incrwritepos(buf, writelen); - writelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dss_s); + writelen = fp_unsigned_bin_size(&dss_s); dropbear_assert(writelen <= SHA1_HASH_SIZE); /* need to pad to 160 bits with leading zeros */ for (i = 0; i < SHA1_HASH_SIZE - writelen; i++) { buf_putbyte(buf, 0); } - if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&dss_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, writelen)) - != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("DSS error"); - } - mp_clear(&dss_s); + fp_to_unsigned_bin(&dss_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, writelen)); + fp_zero(&dss_s); buf_incrwritepos(buf, writelen); - mp_clear_multi(&dss_k, &dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, &dss_r, &dss_s, + m_fp_zero_multi(&dss_k, &dss_temp1, &dss_temp2, &dss_r, &dss_s, &dss_m, NULL); /* create the signature to return */
--- a/dss.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/dss.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -34,12 +34,20 @@ typedef struct { +<<<<<<< mine + fp_int* p; + fp_int* q; + fp_int* g; + fp_int* y; + fp_int* x; +======= mp_int* p; mp_int* q; mp_int* g; mp_int* y; /* x is the private part */ mp_int* x; +>>>>>>> theirs } dropbear_dss_key;
--- a/gendss.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/gendss.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ key = m_malloc(sizeof(*key)); - key->p = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->q = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->g = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->y = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->x = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, key->g, key->y, key->x, NULL); + key->p = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->q = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->g = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->y = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->x = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + m_fp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, key->g, key->y, key->x, NULL); seedrandom(); @@ -77,10 +77,10 @@ buf[0] |= 0x80; /* top bit high */ buf[QSIZE-1] |= 0x01; /* bottom bit high */ - bytes_to_mp(key->q, buf, QSIZE); + bytes_to_fp(key->q, buf, QSIZE); /* 18 rounds are required according to HAC */ - if (mp_prime_next_prime(key->q, 18, 0) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_prime_next_prime(key->q, 18, 0) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); exit(1); } @@ -88,21 +88,18 @@ static void getp(dropbear_dss_key *key, unsigned int size) { - DEF_MP_INT(tempX); - DEF_MP_INT(tempC); - DEF_MP_INT(tempP); - DEF_MP_INT(temp2q); + DEF_FP_INT(tempX); + DEF_FP_INT(tempC); + DEF_FP_INT(tempP); + DEF_FP_INT(temp2q); int result; unsigned char *buf; - m_mp_init_multi(&tempX, &tempC, &tempP, &temp2q, NULL); + m_fp_init_multi(&tempX, &tempC, &tempP, &temp2q, NULL); /* 2*q */ - if (mp_mul_d(key->q, 2, &temp2q) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_mul_d(key->q, 2, &temp2q); buf = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(size); @@ -112,84 +109,74 @@ genrandom(buf, size); buf[0] |= 0x80; /* set the top bit high */ - /* X is a random mp_int */ - bytes_to_mp(&tempX, buf, size); + /* X is a random fp_int */ + bytes_to_fp(&tempX, buf, size); /* C = X mod 2q */ - if (mp_mod(&tempX, &temp2q, &tempC) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mod(&tempX, &temp2q, &tempC) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); exit(1); } /* P = X - (C - 1) = X - C + 1*/ - if (mp_sub(&tempX, &tempC, &tempP) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_sub(&tempX, &tempC, &tempP); - if (mp_add_d(&tempP, 1, key->p) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_add_d(&tempP, 1, key->p); /* now check for prime, 5 rounds is enough according to HAC */ /* result == 1 => p is prime */ - if (mp_prime_is_prime(key->p, 5, &result) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_prime_is_prime(key->p, 5, &result) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); exit(1); } } while (!result); - mp_clear_multi(&tempX, &tempC, &tempP, &temp2q, NULL); + fp_zero(&tempX); + fp_zero(&tempC); + fp_zero(&tempP); + fp_zero(&temp2q); m_burn(buf, size); m_free(buf); } static void getg(dropbear_dss_key * key) { - DEF_MP_INT(div); - DEF_MP_INT(h); - DEF_MP_INT(val); + DEF_FP_INT(div); + DEF_FP_INT(h); + DEF_FP_INT(val); - m_mp_init_multi(&div, &h, &val, NULL); + m_fp_init_multi(&div, &h, &val, NULL); /* get div=(p-1)/q */ - if (mp_sub_d(key->p, 1, &val) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } - if (mp_div(&val, key->q, &div, NULL) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_sub_d(key->p, 1, &val); + fp_div(&val, key->q, &div, NULL); /* initialise h=1 */ - mp_set(&h, 1); + fp_set(&h, 1); do { /* now keep going with g=h^div mod p, until g > 1 */ - if (mp_exptmod(&h, &div, key->p, key->g) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(&h, &div, key->p, key->g) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); exit(1); } - if (mp_add_d(&h, 1, &h) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_add_d(&h, 1, &h); - } while (mp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != MP_GT); + } while (fp_cmp_d(key->g, 1) != FP_GT); - mp_clear_multi(&div, &h, &val, NULL); + fp_zero(&div); + fp_zero(&h); + fp_zero(&val); } static void getx(dropbear_dss_key *key) { - gen_random_mpint(key->q, key->x); + gen_random_fpint(key->q, key->x); } static void gety(dropbear_dss_key *key) { - if (mp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, key->y) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(key->g, key->x, key->p, key->y) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "DSS key generation failed\n"); exit(1); }
--- a/genrsa.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/genrsa.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -33,99 +33,84 @@ #ifdef DROPBEAR_RSA -static void getrsaprime(mp_int* prime, mp_int *primeminus, - mp_int* rsa_e, unsigned int size); +static void getrsaprime(fp_int* prime, fp_int *primeminus, + fp_int* rsa_e, unsigned int size); /* mostly taken from libtomcrypt's rsa key generation routine */ dropbear_rsa_key * gen_rsa_priv_key(unsigned int size) { dropbear_rsa_key * key; - DEF_MP_INT(pminus); - DEF_MP_INT(qminus); - DEF_MP_INT(lcm); + DEF_FP_INT(pminus); + DEF_FP_INT(qminus); + DEF_FP_INT(lcm); key = m_malloc(sizeof(*key)); - key->e = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->n = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->d = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->p = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->q = (mp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); + key->e = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->n = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->d = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->p = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->q = (fp_int*)m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); - m_mp_init_multi(key->e, key->n, key->d, key->p, key->q, + m_fp_init_multi(key->e, key->n, key->d, key->p, key->q, &pminus, &lcm, &qminus, NULL); seedrandom(); - if (mp_set_int(key->e, RSA_E) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_set(key->e, RSA_E); getrsaprime(key->p, &pminus, key->e, size/2); getrsaprime(key->q, &qminus, key->e, size/2); - if (mp_mul(key->p, key->q, key->n) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); + fp_mul(key->p, key->q, key->n); + + /* lcm(p-1, q-1) */ + fp_lcm(&pminus, &qminus, &lcm); + + /* de = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1) */ + /* therefore d = (e^-1) mod lcm(p-1,q-1) */ + if (fp_invmod(key->e, &lcm, key->d) != FP_OKAY) { + fprintf(stderr, "rsa generation failed\n"); exit(1); } - /* lcm(p-1, q-1) */ - if (mp_lcm(&pminus, &qminus, &lcm) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } - - /* de = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1) */ - /* therefore d = (e^-1) mod lcm(p-1,q-1) */ - if (mp_invmod(key->e, &lcm, key->d) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } - - mp_clear_multi(&pminus, &qminus, &lcm, NULL); + m_fp_zero_multi(&pminus, &qminus, &lcm, NULL); return key; } /* return a prime suitable for p or q */ -static void getrsaprime(mp_int* prime, mp_int *primeminus, - mp_int* rsa_e, unsigned int size) { +static void getrsaprime(fp_int* prime, fp_int *primeminus, + fp_int* rsa_e, unsigned int size) { unsigned char *buf; - DEF_MP_INT(temp_gcd); + DEF_FP_INT(temp_gcd); buf = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(size+1); - m_mp_init(&temp_gcd); + m_fp_init(&temp_gcd); do { /* generate a random odd number with MSB set, then find the the next prime above it */ genrandom(buf, size+1); buf[0] |= 0x80; /* MSB set */ - bytes_to_mp(prime, buf, size+1); + bytes_to_fp(prime, buf, size+1); /* find the next integer which is prime, 8 round of miller-rabin */ - if (mp_prime_next_prime(prime, 8, 0) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_prime_next_prime(prime, 8, 0) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); exit(1); } /* subtract one to get p-1 */ - if (mp_sub_d(prime, 1, primeminus) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + fp_sub_d(prime, 1, primeminus); /* check relative primality to e */ - if (mp_gcd(primeminus, rsa_e, &temp_gcd) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA generation failed\n"); - exit(1); - } - } while (mp_cmp_d(&temp_gcd, 1) != MP_EQ); /* while gcd(p-1, e) != 1 */ + fp_gcd(primeminus, rsa_e, &temp_gcd); + } while (fp_cmp_d(&temp_gcd, 1) != FP_EQ); /* while gcd(p-1, e) != 1 */ /* now we have a good value for result */ - mp_clear(&temp_gcd); + fp_zero(&temp_gcd); m_burn(buf, size+1); m_free(buf); }
--- a/kex.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/kex.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ void send_msg_newkeys(); void recv_msg_newkeys(); void kexfirstinitialise(); -void gen_kexdh_vals(mp_int *dh_pub, mp_int *dh_priv); -void kexdh_comb_key(mp_int *dh_pub_us, mp_int *dh_priv, mp_int *dh_pub_them, +void gen_kexdh_vals(fp_int *dh_pub, fp_int *dh_priv); +void kexdh_comb_key(fp_int *dh_pub_us, fp_int *dh_priv, fp_int *dh_pub_them, sign_key *hostkey); #ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB
--- a/keyimport.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/keyimport.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ /* Simple structure to point to an mp-int within a blob. */ -struct mpint_pos { void *start; int bytes; }; +struct fpint_pos { void *start; int bytes; }; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- * Code to read and write OpenSSH private keys. @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ buffer * extrablob = NULL; /* used for calculated values to write */ unsigned char *outblob = NULL; int outlen = -9999; - struct mpint_pos numbers[9]; + struct fpint_pos numbers[9]; int nnumbers = -1, pos, len, seqlen, i; char *header = NULL, *footer = NULL; char zero[1]; @@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ int keytype = -1; #ifdef DROPBEAR_RSA - mp_int dmp1, dmq1, iqmp, tmpval; /* for rsa */ + fp_int dmp1, dmq1, iqmp, tmpval; /* for rsa */ if (key->rsakey != NULL) { keytype = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA; @@ -770,46 +770,42 @@ buf_incrpos(keyblob, numbers[5].bytes); /* now calculate some extra parameters: */ - m_mp_init(&tmpval); - m_mp_init(&dmp1); - m_mp_init(&dmq1); - m_mp_init(&iqmp); + m_fp_init(&tmpval); + m_fp_init(&dmp1); + m_fp_init(&dmq1); + m_fp_init(&iqmp); /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1) */ - if (mp_sub_d(key->rsakey->p, 1, &tmpval) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "Bignum error for p-1\n"); - goto error; - } - if (mp_mod(key->rsakey->d, &tmpval, &dmp1) != MP_OKAY) { + fp_sub_d(key->rsakey->p, 1, &tmpval); + + if (fp_mod(key->rsakey->d, &tmpval, &dmp1) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "Bignum error for dmp1\n"); goto error; } /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1) */ - if (mp_sub_d(key->rsakey->q, 1, &tmpval) != MP_OKAY) { - fprintf(stderr, "Bignum error for q-1\n"); - goto error; - } - if (mp_mod(key->rsakey->d, &tmpval, &dmq1) != MP_OKAY) { + fp_sub_d(key->rsakey->q, 1, &tmpval); + + if (fp_mod(key->rsakey->d, &tmpval, &dmq1) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "Bignum error for dmq1\n"); goto error; } /* iqmp = (q^-1) mod p */ - if (mp_invmod(key->rsakey->q, key->rsakey->p, &iqmp) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_invmod(key->rsakey->q, key->rsakey->p, &iqmp) != FP_OKAY) { fprintf(stderr, "Bignum error for iqmp\n"); goto error; } extrablob = buf_new(2000); - buf_putmpint(extrablob, &dmp1); - buf_putmpint(extrablob, &dmq1); - buf_putmpint(extrablob, &iqmp); + buf_putfpint(extrablob, &dmp1); + buf_putfpint(extrablob, &dmq1); + buf_putfpint(extrablob, &iqmp); buf_setpos(extrablob, 0); - mp_clear(&dmp1); - mp_clear(&dmq1); - mp_clear(&iqmp); - mp_clear(&tmpval); + fp_zero(&dmp1); + fp_zero(&dmq1); + fp_zero(&iqmp); + fp_zero(&tmpval); /* dmp1 */ numbers[6].bytes = buf_getint(extrablob); @@ -974,8 +970,8 @@ /* * The format of the base64 blob is largely ssh2-packet-formatted, - * except that mpints are a bit different: they're more like the - * old ssh1 mpint. You have a 32-bit bit count N, followed by + * except that fpints are a bit different: they're more like the + * old ssh1 fpint. You have a 32-bit bit count N, followed by * (N+7)/8 bytes of data. * * So. The blob contains: @@ -998,20 +994,20 @@ * decryption check.) * * The payload blob, for an RSA key, contains: - * - mpint e - * - mpint d - * - mpint n (yes, the public and private stuff is intermixed) - * - mpint u (presumably inverse of p mod q) - * - mpint p (p is the smaller prime) - * - mpint q (q is the larger) + * - fpint e + * - fpint d + * - fpint n (yes, the public and private stuff is intermixed) + * - fpint u (presumably inverse of p mod q) + * - fpint p (p is the smaller prime) + * - fpint q (q is the larger) * * For a DSA key, the payload blob contains: * - uint32 0 - * - mpint p - * - mpint g - * - mpint q - * - mpint y - * - mpint x + * - fpint p + * - fpint g + * - fpint q + * - fpint y + * - fpint x * * Alternatively, if the parameters are `predefined', that * (0,p,g,q) sequence can be replaced by a uint32 1 and a string @@ -1209,7 +1205,7 @@ return answer; } -static int sshcom_read_mpint(void *data, int len, struct mpint_pos *ret) +static int sshcom_read_fpint(void *data, int len, struct fpint_pos *ret) { int bits; int bytes; @@ -1233,7 +1229,7 @@ return len; /* ensure further calls fail as well */ } -static int sshcom_put_mpint(void *target, void *data, int len) +static int sshcom_put_fpint(void *target, void *data, int len) { unsigned char *d = (unsigned char *)target; unsigned char *i = (unsigned char *)data; @@ -1402,14 +1398,14 @@ blob = snewn(blobsize, unsigned char); privlen = 0; if (type == RSA) { - struct mpint_pos n, e, d, u, p, q; + struct fpint_pos n, e, d, u, p, q; int pos = 0; - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &e); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &d); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &n); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &u); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &p); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &q); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &e); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &d); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &n); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &u); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &p); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &q); if (!q.start) { errmsg = "key data did not contain six integers"; goto error; @@ -1427,17 +1423,17 @@ pos += put_mp(blob+pos, u.start, u.bytes); privlen = pos - publen; } else if (type == DSA) { - struct mpint_pos p, q, g, x, y; + struct fpint_pos p, q, g, x, y; int pos = 4; if (GET_32BIT(ciphertext) != 0) { errmsg = "predefined DSA parameters not supported"; goto error; } - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &p); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &g); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &q); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &y); - pos += sshcom_read_mpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &x); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &p); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &g); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &q); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &y); + pos += sshcom_read_fpint(ciphertext+pos, cipherlen-pos, &x); if (!x.start) { errmsg = "key data did not contain five integers"; goto error; @@ -1489,7 +1485,7 @@ int publen, privlen; unsigned char *outblob; int outlen; - struct mpint_pos numbers[6]; + struct fpint_pos numbers[6]; int nnumbers, initial_zero, pos, lenpos, i; char *type; char *ciphertext; @@ -1510,16 +1506,16 @@ */ if (key->alg == &ssh_rsa) { int pos; - struct mpint_pos n, e, d, p, q, iqmp; + struct fpint_pos n, e, d, p, q, iqmp; pos = 4 + GET_32BIT(pubblob); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &e); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &n); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &e); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &n); pos = 0; - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &d); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &p); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &q); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &iqmp); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &d); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &p); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &q); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &iqmp); dropbear_assert(e.start && iqmp.start); /* can't go wrong */ @@ -1535,15 +1531,15 @@ type = "if-modn{sign{rsa-pkcs1-sha1},encrypt{rsa-pkcs1v2-oaep}}"; } else if (key->alg == &ssh_dss) { int pos; - struct mpint_pos p, q, g, y, x; + struct fpint_pos p, q, g, y, x; pos = 4 + GET_32BIT(pubblob); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &p); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &q); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &g); - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &y); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &p); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &q); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &g); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(pubblob+pos, publen-pos, &y); pos = 0; - pos += ssh2_read_mpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &x); + pos += ssh2_read_fpint(privblob+pos, privlen-pos, &x); dropbear_assert(y.start && x.start); /* can't go wrong */ @@ -1589,7 +1585,7 @@ pos += 4; } for (i = 0; i < nnumbers; i++) - pos += sshcom_put_mpint(outblob+pos, + pos += sshcom_put_fpint(outblob+pos, numbers[i].start, numbers[i].bytes); /* Now wrap up the encrypted payload. */ PUT_32BIT(outblob+lenpos+4, pos - (lenpos+8));
--- a/options.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/options.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ /*#define DROPBEAR_SMALL_CODE*/ /* Enable X11 Forwarding - server only */ -#define ENABLE_X11FWD +/* #define ENABLE_X11FWD */ /* Enable TCP Fowarding */ /* 'Local' is "-L" style (client listening port forwarded via server)
--- a/random.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/random.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -196,18 +196,18 @@ m_burn(hash, sizeof(hash)); } -/* Generates a random mp_int. - * max is a *mp_int specifying an upper bound. - * rand must be an initialised *mp_int for the result. +/* Generates a random fp_int. + * max is a *fp_int specifying an upper bound. + * rand must be an initialised *fp_int for the result. * the result rand satisfies: 0 < rand < max * */ -void gen_random_mpint(mp_int *max, mp_int *rand) { +void gen_random_fpint(fp_int *max, fp_int *rand) { unsigned char *randbuf = NULL; unsigned int len = 0; const unsigned char masks[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}; - const int size_bits = mp_count_bits(max); + const int size_bits = fp_count_bits(max); len = size_bits / 8; if ((size_bits % 8) != 0) { @@ -217,15 +217,15 @@ randbuf = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(len); do { genrandom(randbuf, len); - /* Mask out the unrequired bits - mp_read_unsigned_bin expects + /* Mask out the unrequired bits - fp_read_unsigned_bin expects * MSB first.*/ randbuf[0] &= masks[size_bits % 8]; - bytes_to_mp(rand, randbuf, len); + bytes_to_fp(rand, randbuf, len); /* keep regenerating until we get one satisfying * 0 < rand < max */ - } while (mp_cmp(rand, max) != MP_LT); + } while (fp_cmp(rand, max) != FP_LT); m_burn(randbuf, len); m_free(randbuf); }
--- a/random.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/random.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ #ifndef _RANDOM_H_ #define _RANDOM_H_ -struct mp_int; +struct fp_int; void seedrandom(); void reseedrandom(); void genrandom(unsigned char* buf, int len); void addrandom(unsigned char* buf, int len); -void gen_random_mpint(mp_int *max, mp_int *rand); +void gen_random_mpint(fp_int *max, fp_int *rand); #endif /* _RANDOM_H_ */
--- a/rsa.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/rsa.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -38,35 +38,37 @@ #ifdef DROPBEAR_RSA -static void rsa_pad_em(dropbear_rsa_key * key, +static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key, const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len, - mp_int * rsa_em); + fp_int * rsa_em); + /* Load a public rsa key from a buffer, initialising the values. * The key will have the same format as buf_put_rsa_key. * These should be freed with rsa_key_free. * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key) { +int buf_get_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) { int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE; TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_pub_key")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); - key->e = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->n = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init_multi(key->e, key->n, NULL); + key->e = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->n = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + fp_init(key->e); + fp_init(key->n); key->d = NULL; key->p = NULL; key->q = NULL; buf_incrpos(buf, 4+SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN); /* int + "ssh-rsa" */ - if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->e) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE - || buf_getmpint(buf, key->n) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + if (buf_getfpint(buf, key->e) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE + || buf_getfpint(buf, key->n) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_pub_key: failure")) goto out; } - if (mp_count_bits(key->n) < MIN_RSA_KEYLEN) { + if (fp_count_bits(key->n) < MIN_RSA_KEYLEN) { dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "RSA key too short"); goto out; } @@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ /* Same as buf_get_rsa_pub_key, but reads private bits at the end. * Loads a private rsa key from a buffer * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_get_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key) { +int buf_get_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) { int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE; TRACE(("enter buf_get_rsa_priv_key")) @@ -99,9 +101,9 @@ key->p = NULL; key->q = NULL; - key->d = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init(key->d); - if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->d) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + key->d = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + fp_init(key->d); + if (buf_getfpint(buf, key->d) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: d: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE")) goto out; } @@ -109,16 +111,17 @@ if (buf->pos == buf->len) { /* old Dropbear private keys didn't keep p and q, so we will ignore them*/ } else { - key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(mp_int)); - m_mp_init_multi(key->p, key->q, NULL); + key->p = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + key->q = m_malloc(sizeof(fp_int)); + fp_init(key->p); + fp_init(key->q); - if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + if (buf_getfpint(buf, key->p) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: p: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE")) goto out; } - if (buf_getmpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { + if (buf_getfpint(buf, key->q) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { TRACE(("leave buf_get_rsa_priv_key: q: ret == DROPBEAR_FAILURE")) goto out; } @@ -137,7 +140,7 @@ /* Clear and free the memory used by a public or private key */ -void rsa_key_free(dropbear_rsa_key *key) { +void rsa_key_free(rsa_key *key) { TRACE(("enter rsa_key_free")) @@ -146,23 +149,23 @@ return; } if (key->d) { - mp_clear(key->d); + fp_zero(key->d); m_free(key->d); } if (key->e) { - mp_clear(key->e); + fp_zero(key->e); m_free(key->e); } if (key->n) { - mp_clear(key->n); + fp_zero(key->n); m_free(key->n); } if (key->p) { - mp_clear(key->p); + fp_zero(key->p); m_free(key->p); } if (key->q) { - mp_clear(key->q); + fp_zero(key->q); m_free(key->q); } m_free(key); @@ -172,37 +175,37 @@ /* Put the public rsa key into the buffer in the required format: * * string "ssh-rsa" - * mp_int e - * mp_int n + * fp_int e + * fp_int n */ -void buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key) { +void buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) { TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_pub_key")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->e); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->n); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->e); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->n); TRACE(("leave buf_put_rsa_pub_key")) } /* Same as buf_put_rsa_pub_key, but with the private "x" key appended */ -void buf_put_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key) { +void buf_put_rsa_priv_key(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key) { TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_priv_key")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); buf_put_rsa_pub_key(buf, key); - buf_putmpint(buf, key->d); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->d); /* new versions have p and q, old versions don't */ if (key->p) { - buf_putmpint(buf, key->p); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->p); } if (key->q) { - buf_putmpint(buf, key->q); + buf_putfpint(buf, key->q); } @@ -213,35 +216,34 @@ #ifdef DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_VERIFY /* Verify a signature in buf, made on data by the key given. * Returns DROPBEAR_SUCCESS or DROPBEAR_FAILURE */ -int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data, +int buf_rsa_verify(buffer * buf, rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data, unsigned int len) { unsigned int slen; - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s); - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_mdash); - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_em); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_s); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_mdash); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_em); int ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE; TRACE(("enter buf_rsa_verify")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); - m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL); + fp_init(&rsa_mdash); + fp_init(&rsa_s); + fp_init(&rsa_em); slen = buf_getint(buf); - if (slen != (unsigned int)mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n)) { + if (slen != (unsigned int)fp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n)) { TRACE(("bad size")) goto out; } - if (mp_read_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getptr(buf, buf->len - buf->pos), - buf->len - buf->pos) != MP_OKAY) { - TRACE(("failed reading rsa_s")) - goto out; - } + fp_read_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getptr(buf, buf->len - buf->pos), + buf->len - buf->pos); /* check that s <= n-1 */ - if (mp_cmp(&rsa_s, key->n) != MP_LT) { + if (fp_cmp(&rsa_s, key->n) != FP_LT) { TRACE(("s > n-1")) goto out; } @@ -249,19 +251,22 @@ /* create the magic PKCS padded value */ rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_em); - if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_s, key->e, key->n, &rsa_mdash) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(&rsa_s, key->e, key->n, &rsa_mdash) != FP_OKAY) { TRACE(("failed exptmod rsa_s")) goto out; } - if (mp_cmp(&rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == MP_EQ) { + if (fp_cmp(&rsa_em, &rsa_mdash) == FP_EQ) { /* signature is valid */ TRACE(("success!")) ret = DROPBEAR_SUCCESS; } out: - mp_clear_multi(&rsa_mdash, &rsa_s, &rsa_em, NULL); + fp_zero(&rsa_mdash); + fp_zero(&rsa_s); + fp_zero(&rsa_em); + TRACE(("leave buf_rsa_verify: ret %d", ret)) return ret; } @@ -270,20 +275,23 @@ /* Sign the data presented with key, writing the signature contents * to the buffer */ -void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, dropbear_rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data, +void buf_put_rsa_sign(buffer* buf, rsa_key *key, const unsigned char* data, unsigned int len) { unsigned int nsize, ssize; unsigned int i; - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_s); - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp1); - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp2); - DEF_MP_INT(rsa_tmp3); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_s); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_tmp1); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_tmp2); + DEF_FP_INT(rsa_tmp3); TRACE(("enter buf_put_rsa_sign")) dropbear_assert(key != NULL); - m_mp_init_multi(&rsa_s, &rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL); + fp_init(&rsa_s); + fp_init(&rsa_tmp1); + fp_init(&rsa_tmp2); + fp_init(&rsa_tmp3); rsa_pad_em(key, data, len, &rsa_tmp1); @@ -295,32 +303,32 @@ /* generate the r blinding value */ /* rsa_tmp2 is r */ - gen_random_mpint(key->n, &rsa_tmp2); + gen_random_fpint(key->n, &rsa_tmp2); /* rsa_tmp1 is em */ /* em' = em * r^e mod n */ /* rsa_s used as a temp var*/ - if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->e, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->e, key->n, &rsa_s) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("RSA error"); } - if (mp_invmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->n, &rsa_tmp3) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_invmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->n, &rsa_tmp3) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("RSA error"); } - if (mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_s, key->n, &rsa_tmp2) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_s, key->n, &rsa_tmp2) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("RSA error"); } /* rsa_tmp2 is em' */ /* s' = (em')^d mod n */ - if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->d, key->n, &rsa_tmp1) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp2, key->d, key->n, &rsa_tmp1) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("RSA error"); } /* rsa_tmp1 is s' */ /* rsa_tmp3 is r^(-1) mod n */ /* s = (s')r^(-1) mod n */ - if (mp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp3, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_mulmod(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp3, key->n, &rsa_s) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("RSA error"); } @@ -328,33 +336,34 @@ /* s = em^d mod n */ /* rsa_tmp1 is em */ - if (mp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp1, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != MP_OKAY) { + if (fp_exptmod(&rsa_tmp1, key->d, key->n, &rsa_s) != FP_OKAY) { dropbear_exit("RSA error"); } #endif /* RSA_BLINDING */ - mp_clear_multi(&rsa_tmp1, &rsa_tmp2, &rsa_tmp3, NULL); + fp_zero(&rsa_tmp1); + fp_zero(&rsa_tmp2); + fp_zero(&rsa_tmp3); /* create the signature to return */ buf_putstring(buf, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA, SSH_SIGNKEY_RSA_LEN); - nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n); + nsize = fp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n); /* string rsa_signature_blob length */ buf_putint(buf, nsize); /* pad out s to same length as n */ - ssize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&rsa_s); + ssize = fp_unsigned_bin_size(&rsa_s); dropbear_assert(ssize <= nsize); for (i = 0; i < nsize-ssize; i++) { buf_putbyte(buf, 0x00); } - if (mp_to_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, ssize)) != MP_OKAY) { - dropbear_exit("RSA error"); - } + fp_to_unsigned_bin(&rsa_s, buf_getwriteptr(buf, ssize)); + buf_incrwritepos(buf, ssize); - mp_clear(&rsa_s); + fp_zero(&rsa_s); #if defined(DEBUG_RSA) && defined(DEBUG_TRACE) printhex("RSA sig", buf->data, buf->len); @@ -374,11 +383,11 @@ * prefix is the ASN1 designator prefix, * hex 30 21 30 09 06 05 2B 0E 03 02 1A 05 00 04 14 * - * rsa_em must be a pointer to an initialised mp_int. + * rsa_em must be a pointer to an initialised fp_int. */ -static void rsa_pad_em(dropbear_rsa_key * key, +static void rsa_pad_em(rsa_key * key, const unsigned char * data, unsigned int len, - mp_int * rsa_em) { + fp_int * rsa_em) { /* ASN1 designator (including the 0x00 preceding) */ const unsigned char rsa_asn1_magic[] = @@ -392,7 +401,7 @@ dropbear_assert(key != NULL); dropbear_assert(data != NULL); - nsize = mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n); + nsize = fp_unsigned_bin_size(key->n); rsa_EM = buf_new(nsize-1); /* type byte */ @@ -414,9 +423,9 @@ dropbear_assert(rsa_EM->pos == rsa_EM->size); - /* Create the mp_int from the encoded bytes */ + /* Create the fp_int from the encoded bytes */ buf_setpos(rsa_EM, 0); - bytes_to_mp(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size), + bytes_to_fp(rsa_em, buf_getptr(rsa_EM, rsa_EM->size), rsa_EM->size); buf_free(rsa_EM); }
--- a/rsa.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/rsa.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -34,12 +34,12 @@ typedef struct { - mp_int* n; - mp_int* e; + fp_int* n; + fp_int* e; /* d, p, and q are private parts */ - mp_int* d; - mp_int* p; - mp_int* q; + fp_int* d; + fp_int* p; + fp_int* q; } dropbear_rsa_key;
--- a/session.h Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/session.h Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ struct key_context *newkeys; unsigned char *session_id; /* this is the hash from the first kex */ /* The below are used temorarily during kex, are freed after use */ - mp_int * dh_K; /* SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY and sending SSH_MSH_NEWKEYS */ + fp_int * dh_K; /* SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY and sending SSH_MSH_NEWKEYS */ unsigned char hash[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; /* the hash*/ buffer* kexhashbuf; /* session hash buffer calculated from various packets*/ buffer* transkexinit; /* the kexinit packet we send should be kept so we @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ struct clientsession { - mp_int *dh_e, *dh_x; /* Used during KEX */ + fp_int *dh_e, *dh_x; /* Used during KEX */ cli_kex_state kex_state; /* Used for progressing KEX */ cli_state state; /* Used to progress auth/channelsession etc */ unsigned donefirstkex : 1; /* Set when we set sentnewkeys, never reset */
--- a/svr-kex.c Thu Nov 10 18:17:00 2011 +0800 +++ b/svr-kex.c Mon Nov 21 19:52:28 2011 +0800 @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ #include "runopts.h" -static void send_msg_kexdh_reply(mp_int *dh_e); +static void send_msg_kexdh_reply(fp_int *dh_e); /* Handle a diffie-hellman key exchange initialisation. This involves * calculating a session key reply value, and corresponding hash. These @@ -44,21 +44,21 @@ * that function, then brings the new keys into use */ void recv_msg_kexdh_init() { - DEF_MP_INT(dh_e); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_e); TRACE(("enter recv_msg_kexdh_init")) if (!ses.kexstate.recvkexinit) { dropbear_exit("Premature kexdh_init message received"); } - m_mp_init(&dh_e); - if (buf_getmpint(ses.payload, &dh_e) != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { + m_fp_init(&dh_e); + if (buf_getfpint(ses.payload, &dh_e) != DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) { dropbear_exit("Failed to get kex value"); } send_msg_kexdh_reply(&dh_e); - mp_clear(&dh_e); + fp_zero(&dh_e); send_msg_newkeys(); ses.requirenext = SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS; @@ -71,18 +71,18 @@ * result is sent to the client. * * See the transport rfc 4253 section 8 for details */ -static void send_msg_kexdh_reply(mp_int *dh_e) { +static void send_msg_kexdh_reply(fp_int *dh_e) { - DEF_MP_INT(dh_y); - DEF_MP_INT(dh_f); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_y); + DEF_FP_INT(dh_f); TRACE(("enter send_msg_kexdh_reply")) - m_mp_init_multi(&dh_y, &dh_f, NULL); + m_fp_init_multi(&dh_y, &dh_f, NULL); gen_kexdh_vals(&dh_f, &dh_y); kexdh_comb_key(&dh_f, &dh_y, dh_e, svr_opts.hostkey); - mp_clear(&dh_y); + fp_zero(&dh_y); /* we can start creating the kexdh_reply packet */ CHECKCLEARTOWRITE(); @@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ ses.newkeys->algo_hostkey); /* put f */ - buf_putmpint(ses.writepayload, &dh_f); - mp_clear(&dh_f); + buf_putfpint(ses.writepayload, &dh_f); + fp_zero(&dh_f); /* calc the signature */ buf_put_sign(ses.writepayload, svr_opts.hostkey,