Mercurial > dropbear
changeset 684:c37857676924 insecure-nocrypto
Merge in "-m"/"-c" code
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Thu, 17 May 2012 08:09:19 +0800 |
parents | a4b7627b3157 (diff) 63f8d6c469cf (current diff) |
children | 5af8993f7529 |
files | common-algo.c common-kex.c options.h |
diffstat | 6 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) [+] |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- a/cli-auth.c Thu May 17 00:26:12 2012 +0800 +++ b/cli-auth.c Thu May 17 08:09:19 2012 +0800 @@ -257,7 +257,10 @@ #endif #ifdef ENABLE_CLI_INTERACT_AUTH - if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_INTERACT) { + if (ses.keys->trans.algo_crypt->cipherdesc == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, I won't let you use interactive auth unencrypted.\n"); + } + else if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_INTERACT) { if (cli_ses.auth_interact_failed) { finished = 0; } else { @@ -269,7 +272,10 @@ #endif #ifdef ENABLE_CLI_PASSWORD_AUTH - if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD) { + if (ses.keys->trans.algo_crypt->cipherdesc == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, I won't let you use password auth unencrypted.\n"); + } + else if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD) { cli_auth_password(); finished = 1; cli_ses.lastauthtype = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;
--- a/common-algo.c Thu May 17 00:26:12 2012 +0800 +++ b/common-algo.c Thu May 17 08:09:19 2012 +0800 @@ -106,6 +106,14 @@ static const struct dropbear_hash dropbear_sha1_96 = {&sha1_desc, 20, 12}; #endif +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC +static const struct dropbear_hash dropbear_sha2_256 = + {&sha256_desc, 32, 32}; +#endif +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC +static const struct dropbear_hash dropbear_sha2_512 = + {&sha512_desc, 64, 64}; +#endif #ifdef DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC static const struct dropbear_hash dropbear_md5 = {&md5_desc, 16, 16}; @@ -152,10 +160,19 @@ #ifdef DROPBEAR_BLOWFISH {"blowfish-cbc", 0, &dropbear_blowfish, 1, &dropbear_mode_cbc}, #endif +#ifdef DROPBEAR_NONE_CIPHER + {"none", 0, (void*)&dropbear_nocipher, 1, &dropbear_mode_none}, +#endif {NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL} }; algo_type sshhashes[] = { +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC +// {"hmac-sha2-256", 0, &dropbear_sha2_256, 1, NULL}, +#endif +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC +// {"hmac-sha2-512", 0, &dropbear_sha2_512, 1, NULL}, +#endif #ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA1_96_HMAC {"hmac-sha1-96", 0, &dropbear_sha1_96, 1, NULL}, #endif @@ -163,7 +180,10 @@ {"hmac-sha1", 0, &dropbear_sha1, 1, NULL}, #endif #ifdef DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC - {"hmac-md5", 0, &dropbear_md5, 1, NULL}, + {"hmac-md5", 0, (void*)&dropbear_md5, 1, NULL}, +#endif +#ifdef DROPBEAR_NONE_INTEGRITY + {"none", 0, (void*)&dropbear_nohash, 1, NULL}, #endif {NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL} };
--- a/common-kex.c Thu May 17 00:26:12 2012 +0800 +++ b/common-kex.c Thu May 17 08:09:19 2012 +0800 @@ -249,26 +249,28 @@ * already initialised hash_state hs, which should already have processed * the dh_K and hash, since these are common. X is the letter 'A', 'B' etc. * out must have at least min(SHA1_HASH_SIZE, outlen) bytes allocated. - * The output will only be expanded once, as we are assured that - * outlen <= 2*SHA1_HASH_SIZE for all known hashes. * * See Section 7.2 of rfc4253 (ssh transport) for details */ static void hashkeys(unsigned char *out, int outlen, const hash_state * hs, const unsigned char X) { hash_state hs2; - unsigned char k2[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; /* used to extending */ + int offset; memcpy(&hs2, hs, sizeof(hash_state)); sha1_process(&hs2, &X, 1); sha1_process(&hs2, ses.session_id, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); sha1_done(&hs2, out); - if (SHA1_HASH_SIZE < outlen) { + for (offset = SHA1_HASH_SIZE; + offset < outlen; + offset += SHA1_HASH_SIZE) + { /* need to extend */ + unsigned char k2[SHA1_HASH_SIZE]; memcpy(&hs2, hs, sizeof(hash_state)); - sha1_process(&hs2, out, SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + sha1_process(&hs2, out, offset); sha1_done(&hs2, k2); - memcpy(&out[SHA1_HASH_SIZE], k2, outlen - SHA1_HASH_SIZE); + memcpy(&out[offset], k2, MIN(outlen - offset, SHA1_HASH_SIZE)); } } @@ -292,7 +294,6 @@ hash_state hs; unsigned int C2S_keysize, S2C_keysize; char mactransletter, macrecvletter; /* Client or server specific */ - int recv_cipher = 0, trans_cipher = 0; TRACE(("enter gen_new_keys")) /* the dh_K and hash are the start of all hashes, we make use of that */ @@ -329,31 +330,39 @@ hashkeys(C2S_key, C2S_keysize, &hs, 'C'); hashkeys(S2C_key, S2C_keysize, &hs, 'D'); - recv_cipher = find_cipher(ses.newkeys->recv.algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name); - if (recv_cipher < 0) - dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); - if (ses.newkeys->recv.crypt_mode->start(recv_cipher, - recv_IV, recv_key, - ses.newkeys->recv.algo_crypt->keysize, 0, - &ses.newkeys->recv.cipher_state) != CRYPT_OK) { - dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); + if (ses.newkeys->recv.algo_crypt->cipherdesc != NULL) { + int recv_cipher = find_cipher(ses.newkeys->recv.algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name); + if (recv_cipher < 0) + dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); + if (ses.newkeys->recv.crypt_mode->start(recv_cipher, + recv_IV, recv_key, + ses.newkeys->recv.algo_crypt->keysize, 0, + &ses.newkeys->recv.cipher_state) != CRYPT_OK) { + dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); + } } - trans_cipher = find_cipher(ses.newkeys->trans.algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name); - if (trans_cipher < 0) - dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); - if (ses.newkeys->trans.crypt_mode->start(trans_cipher, - trans_IV, trans_key, - ses.newkeys->trans.algo_crypt->keysize, 0, - &ses.newkeys->trans.cipher_state) != CRYPT_OK) { - dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); + if (ses.newkeys->trans.algo_crypt->cipherdesc != NULL) { + int trans_cipher = find_cipher(ses.newkeys->trans.algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name); + if (trans_cipher < 0) + dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); + if (ses.newkeys->trans.crypt_mode->start(trans_cipher, + trans_IV, trans_key, + ses.newkeys->trans.algo_crypt->keysize, 0, + &ses.newkeys->trans.cipher_state) != CRYPT_OK) { + dropbear_exit("Crypto error"); + } } - + /* MAC keys */ - hashkeys(ses.newkeys->trans.mackey, - ses.newkeys->trans.algo_mac->keysize, &hs, mactransletter); - hashkeys(ses.newkeys->recv.mackey, - ses.newkeys->recv.algo_mac->keysize, &hs, macrecvletter); + if (ses.newkeys->trans.algo_mac->hashdesc != NULL) { + hashkeys(ses.newkeys->trans.mackey, + ses.newkeys->trans.algo_mac->keysize, &hs, mactransletter); + } + if (ses.newkeys->recv.algo_mac->hashdesc != NULL) { + hashkeys(ses.newkeys->recv.mackey, + ses.newkeys->recv.algo_mac->keysize, &hs, macrecvletter); + } ses.newkeys->trans.hash_index = find_hash(ses.newkeys->trans.algo_mac->hashdesc->name), ses.newkeys->recv.hash_index = find_hash(ses.newkeys->recv.algo_mac->hashdesc->name),
--- a/libtomcrypt/src/headers/tomcrypt_custom.h Thu May 17 00:26:12 2012 +0800 +++ b/libtomcrypt/src/headers/tomcrypt_custom.h Thu May 17 08:09:19 2012 +0800 @@ -118,14 +118,18 @@ #define LTC_CTR_MODE #endif -#if defined(DROPBEAR_DSS) && defined(DSS_PROTOK) -#define SHA512 +#define SHA1 + +#ifdef DROPBEAR_MD5 +#define MD5 #endif -#define SHA1 +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA256 +#define SHA256 +#endif -#ifdef DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC -#define MD5 +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA512 +#define SHA512 #endif #define LTC_HMAC
--- a/options.h Thu May 17 00:26:12 2012 +0800 +++ b/options.h Thu May 17 08:09:19 2012 +0800 @@ -100,6 +100,18 @@ * size and is recommended for most cases */ #define DROPBEAR_ENABLE_CTR_MODE +/* You can compile with no encryption if you want. In some circumstances + * this could be safe security-wise, though make sure you know what + * you're doing. Anyone can see everything that goes over the wire, so + * the only safe auth method is public key. You'll have to disable all other + * ciphers above in the client if you want to use this, or implement cipher + * prioritisation in cli-runopts. + * + * The best way to do things is probably make normal compile of dropbear with + * all ciphers including "none" as the server, then recompile a special + * "dbclient-insecure" client. */ +#define DROPBEAR_NONE_CIPHER + /* Message Integrity - at least one required. * Protocol RFC requires sha1 and recommends sha1-96. * sha1-96 is of use for slow links as it has a smaller overhead. @@ -112,11 +124,19 @@ * These hashes are also used for public key fingerprints in logs. * If you disable MD5, Dropbear will fall back to SHA1 fingerprints, * which are not the standard form. */ - #define DROPBEAR_SHA1_HMAC #define DROPBEAR_SHA1_96_HMAC +/*#define DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC*/ +/*#define DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC*/ #define DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC +/* You can also disable integrity. Don't bother disabling this if you're + * still using a cipher, it's relatively cheap. If you disable this it's dead + * simple to run arbitrary commands on the remote host. Beware. + * Note again, for the client you will have to disable other hashes above + * to use this. */ +#define DROPBEAR_NONE_INTEGRITY + /* Hostkey/public key algorithms - at least one required, these are used * for hostkey as well as for verifying signatures with pubkey auth. * Removing either of these won't save very much space.
--- a/sysoptions.h Thu May 17 00:26:12 2012 +0800 +++ b/sysoptions.h Thu May 17 08:09:19 2012 +0800 @@ -90,7 +90,13 @@ #define MAX_KEY_LEN 32 /* 256 bits for aes256 etc */ #define MAX_IV_LEN 20 /* must be same as max blocksize, and >= SHA1_HASH_SIZE */ +#if defined(DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC) +#define MAX_MAC_KEY 64 +#elif defined(DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC) +#define MAX_MAC_KEY 32 +#else #define MAX_MAC_KEY 20 +#endif #define MAX_NAME_LEN 64 /* maximum length of a protocol name, isn't explicitly specified for all protocols (just @@ -144,6 +150,19 @@ #define DROPBEAR_TWOFISH #endif +#ifdef DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC +#define DROPBEAR_MD5 +#endif + +#ifdef DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC +#define DROPBEAR_SHA256 +#endif + +#if (defined(DROPBEAR_DSS) && defined(DSS_PROTOK)) \ + || defined(DROPBEAR_SHA2_512_HMAC) +#define DROPBEAR_SHA512 +#endif + #ifndef ENABLE_X11FWD #define DISABLE_X11FWD #endif