Mercurial > dropbear
changeset 850:7507b174bba0 ecc
- Make curve25519 work after fixing a typo, interoperates with OpenSSH
- comment on ecc binary size effects
author | Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> |
---|---|
date | Sat, 09 Nov 2013 00:02:26 +0800 |
parents | 754d7bee1068 |
children | c1c1b43f78c2 |
files | cli-kex.c options.h svr-kex.c sysoptions.h |
diffstat | 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) [+] |
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line diff
--- a/cli-kex.c Fri Nov 08 23:32:13 2013 +0800 +++ b/cli-kex.c Sat Nov 09 00:02:26 2013 +0800 @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ } cli_ses.curve25519_param = gen_kexcurve25519_param(); } - buf_putstring(ses.writepayload, cli_ses.curve25519_param->priv, CURVE25519_LEN); + buf_putstring(ses.writepayload, cli_ses.curve25519_param->pub, CURVE25519_LEN); #endif break; }
--- a/options.h Fri Nov 08 23:32:13 2013 +0800 +++ b/options.h Sat Nov 09 00:02:26 2013 +0800 @@ -138,22 +138,24 @@ * SSH2 RFC Draft requires dss, recommends rsa */ #define DROPBEAR_RSA #define DROPBEAR_DSS +/* ECDSA is significantly faster than RSA or DSS. Compiling in ECC + * code (either ECDSA or ECDH) increases binary size - around 30kB + * on x86-64 */ #define DROPBEAR_ECDSA /* Generate hostkeys as-needed when the first connection using that key type occurs. This avoids the need to otherwise run "dropbearkey" and avoids some problems - with badly seeded random devices when systems first boot. + with badly seeded /dev/urandom when systems first boot. This also requires a runtime flag "-R". */ #define DROPBEAR_DELAY_HOSTKEY +/* Enable Curve25519 for key exchange. This is another elliptic + * curve method with good security properties. Increases binary size + * by ~10kB on x86-64 */ #define DROPBEAR_CURVE25519 -/* RSA can be vulnerable to timing attacks which use the time required for - * signing to guess the private key. Blinding avoids this attack, though makes - * signing operations slightly slower. */ -#define RSA_BLINDING - -/* Enable elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange */ +/* Enable elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange, see note about + * ECDSA above */ #define DROPBEAR_ECDH /* Control the memory/performance/compression tradeoff for zlib.
--- a/svr-kex.c Fri Nov 08 23:32:13 2013 +0800 +++ b/svr-kex.c Sat Nov 09 00:02:26 2013 +0800 @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ { struct kex_curve25519_param *param = gen_kexcurve25519_param(); kexcurve25519_comb_key(param, ecdh_qs, svr_opts.hostkey); - buf_putstring(ses.writepayload, param->priv, CURVE25519_LEN); + buf_putstring(ses.writepayload, param->pub, CURVE25519_LEN); free_kexcurve25519_param(param); } #endif
--- a/sysoptions.h Fri Nov 08 23:32:13 2013 +0800 +++ b/sysoptions.h Sat Nov 09 00:02:26 2013 +0800 @@ -104,8 +104,13 @@ #define DROPBEAR_LTC_PRNG #endif +/* RSA can be vulnerable to timing attacks which use the time required for + * signing to guess the private key. Blinding avoids this attack, though makes + * signing operations slightly slower. */ +#define RSA_BLINDING + /* hashes which will be linked and registered */ -#if defined(DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC) || defined(DROPBEAR_ECC_256) +#if defined(DROPBEAR_SHA2_256_HMAC) || defined(DROPBEAR_ECC_256) || defined(DROPBEAR_CURVE25519) #define DROPBEAR_SHA256 #endif #if defined(DROPBEAR_ECC_384)